JUDGMENT

Dunkley, J - This case has had an unfortunate history. As originally filed in the Township Court of Pyu it was a simple suit on a mortgage and should have reached judgment in due course within a few months of its institution, but owing in part to ignorance and carelessness! on the part of the pleaders concerned, but mainly in consequence of gross carelessness and lack of attention to his duties on the part of the learned Township Judge, it was pending for two and a half years, and was then extremely badly tried, and, in fact, even at that stage it seems probable that no decision would have been reached had not the parties themselves given up the hops of getting the ease tried and decided not to examine their witnesses. The decision of the Township Judge was taken on appeal to the District Court, and the learned District Judge has pointed out most of the errors of law, practice and procedure, committed by the Township Judge, and has corrected them, with the result that the decree of the District Court, as it appears now before me, on the face of it affords a correct decision of the original suit. The judgment and decree of the District Court have been attacked before me on behalf of the appellants on two grounds: Firstly, it is urged that on the pleadings as framed, and in view of the provisions of Section 68, Evidence Act, evidence to prove that the deed of mortgage, which formed the basis of the suit, had been duly executed and attested was necessary, and that as such evidence had not been called a mortgage decree could not be passed against the present appellants; and in support of this contention the case in Chettyar Firm v. U Htaw 1933 Rang. 6, is cited, and certainly this case closely resembles the present case. Secondly, it is argued that as against the first appellant, the F.L.N.K.L., Chettyar firm, the suit was barred by limitation and that therefore it ought to have been dismissed as against this firm. The plaintiff respondents were the original mortgagees. The original mortgagors were Ko Kan Ya and Ma Chit Mai, and they admitted the mortgage, their defence being that the amount due on the mortgage bond had been duly paid and the mortgage discharged. The present second appellant, Maung Tun Sein, was joined as a defendant as the legal representative of one Ma Shwe Hmyi, who had purchased the mortgaged property from the mortgagors, and the present first appellant, P.L.N.K.L. Chettyar firm, was joined as a defendant as being the mortgagee from Ma Shwe Hmyi of this property.

2. A number of amended plaints were filed at various times in this suit, and the defendants, including the present appellants, have filed various defences in reply to the different plaints The first plaint in which the appellant, P.L.N.K.L., firm, was mentioned as a defendant was filed on 8th August 1932. The mortgage deed upon which the suit -was brought is dated 6th August 1920, and therefore on the face of it, it would seem that the suit as against this appellant was time-barred. But when the mortgage deed is read completely it is seen that it contains a provision that the principal and interest due thereon shall be paid in full during the month of Tabodwe, 1282 B.E., that is, that it must be paid at the latest by 9th March 1921, which was the last day of the month of Tabodwe, 1282 B.E. Consequently, the mortgagee's right to sue did not arise until that date, and time did not begin to run until then. Hence, as the suit as against the appellant Chettyar firm was instituted on 8th August 1932 it was well within time.

3. In regard to the remaining point, this must depend upon whether, on a true construction of their last written statements, the two appellants must be held to have admitted the mortgage or not,. The ruling in Chettyar Firm v. U Htaw 1933 Rang. 6, of course, refers to a case where there is no admission by the defendant of the due execution and attestation of the mortgage, and if it be held that on the pleadings the defendants, incl