JUDGMENT

Baguley, J - This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent on a promissory note. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court, but on appeal the District Court gave a decree for the amount claimed, so the defendants come here in second appeal. Many grounds were argued by the appellants' advocate, but as the appeal can be allowed upon one ground alone it is unnecessary to consider the other ones. The suit was filed on the 13th of October 1933 on a promissory note dated the 25th of July 1929, so prima facie it was time-barred. The plaint however sets out certain payments as a result of which it was claimed that limitation was saved, it being said that the defendants acknowledged payment towards the promissory note in suit at the back of the same on the 17th of October 1930. The promissory note itself bears on the reverse the endorsement:

On 11th Lazok Tadingyut, 1293, interest Rs. 100 is paid. Theingan Ma Mya Yin.

2. The plaintiff's case is that when this payment was made the two defendants 'signed their names on the back of the promissory note, and, after they had signed it, the endorsement was written in by one Fo Maung. This is the plaintiff's own case, and it is claimed first that this would extend limitation under Section 20 of the Limitation Act. Section 20 provides that where interest is paid as such before the expiration of the prescribed period limitation is saved.

provided that...an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of or in a writing signed by the person making the payment.

3. This acknowledgment is not in the hand-writing of the defendants. It can therefore only save limitation under this section if the endorsement as a whole is regarded as a writing signed by the person (S) making the payment. In my opinion it cannot be so regarded. A person cannot sign a writing which does not exist, and it is common ground that the signatures appeared on the back of the promissory note before the writing on it. It might perhaps be very plausibly argued that if a person wrote his name and authorized some one to write an endorsement above his signature, then he has constructively signed the endorsement. Be that as it may, it is not the plaintiff's case that the defendants told Po Maung to write this endorsement over their signatures. Po Maung himself says:

I wrote payment of Rs. 100 in 1292 at the Chettinad Bank as the plaintiff and his clerk, said to me that the sum of Rs. 100 had been paid.... As I was entering the house I saw the defendants leave the house.

4. He does not suggest in any way whatsoever that the defendants asked him to write this endorsement over by the plaintiff. Pecbaiyar says:

The two defendants signed the promissory note on the back of it. Vellu was sent by him (apparently, the plaintiff) to call Ko Po Maung, who came to my house. As he was coming to my house the two defendants were leaving my house.

5. The plaintiff's case thus seems to me is that defendants signed their names and afterwards, without consulting them and without their authorization, Po Maung wrote the endorsement over their signatures. I cannot hold that this is an acknowledgment of the payment in a writing signed by the persons making the payment. Limitation, therefore, cannot be extended under Section 20 of the Limitation Act.

6. Alternatively, however, it, was argued that the signature of the defendants on the back of the promissory note must be taken to be an acknowledgment in writing of liability which would save limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The contention amounts to this: that a signature by a debtor on the back of the promissory note executed by him is an acknowledgment of liability. I am unable to agree with this contention. In Niwajkhan Mathankhan v. Dadabhai Musse Valli 1916 Bom. 125, in the judgment of Scott, C.J., appears the passage:

A mere signature is not a statement of a payment, and it is meaningless without something in writing to which it is appended which will record the fac