JUDGMENT

Ba U, J - This case arises in these circumstances. One Ma Tin, a broker in jewellery, took various articles of jewellery, namely (1) a ring set with nine diamonds; (2) two pairs of diamond ?agats; (3) one set of diamond buttons: (4) one pair of gold bangles set with imitation stones; (5) two necklaces; and (6) two emerald rings sat with 13 diamonds each on four different occasions within one month from Messrs. Hiralal & Co. on a representation that she had some prospective buyers for them. At about the same time she took two pairs of diamond nagats1- from Ma Ywet and (1) one pair of diamond bangles; (2) two pairs of diamond nagats; (3) one diamond ring; (4) two diamond hairpins; (5) two pairs of diamond rings; (6) 5 diamonds with Ma Yi making the same representation as she had made to Messrs. Hiralal & Co. Either on the day on which she received them or the day or two after, she pledged some of them with U Sulaiman, a retired Secretary of the Bassein Municipality, instead of selling them as she was asked to do by the owners, and absconded from Bassein. A report was lodged with the police and she was arrested and sent up for trial. The jewelleries which she had pledged with U Sulaiman were seized from the latter and produced in Court as exhibits.

2. All these facts were found to be proved and she was convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment under Section 420, I.P.C. The Magistrate also passed an order directing the return of the jewelleries seized from U Sulaiman to their respective owners. In doing so the Magistrate relied on the decision given in Kona Lone v. Ma Kay (1907) 4 L.B.R. 13 and Chagan Lal v. Po Kauk (1922) 1 Bur L.J 152. U Sulaiman applied to the learned Sessions Judge of Bassein for revision of the order of the Magistrate but without success. In rejecting U Sulaiman's application the learned Sessions Judge also relied on the same cases as the Magistrate. It is now urged that the law as laid down in the abovementioned cases is no longer good law inasmuch as Section 178, Contract Act, has been amended by the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1930. It is true that Section 178 has now been amended and the law applicable to the facts of this ease is to be found in Section 178 and 178-A as amended. What is in my opinion more applicable to the facts of this case is Section 178, which is, as it now stands, in these terms:

Where a mercantile agent is, with the con-gent of the owner, in possession of the goods or the documents o? title to goods, any pledge made by him, when acting in the ordinary course o? business of a mercantile agent, shall be as valid as if he ware expressly authorised by the owner if the goods to make the same; provided that the pawnee acts in good faith, and has not at the time of the pledge notice that the pawnor has not authority to pledge.

Explanation.--In this section the expressions "mercantile agent" and "documents of title" ghall have the meanings assigned to them in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

"Mercantile agent" as defined in Section 2, Sale of floods Act, means "an agent having in the customary course of business as such agent authority either to sell goods or to consign goods for the purpose of sale or to buy goods or to raise money on the security of goods.

3. I have no doubt in my mind that Ma Tin was according to this definition a mercantile agent. She was a broker in jewellery and she was given the jewelleries in question by their owners for sale. The fact that they were given to her because of her false representation is for the purpose of this case in my opinion beside the point. Therefore Ma Tin could in my opinion make a valid pledge provided the pawnee acted in good faith and had not at the time of the pledge notice that that pawner, that is Ma Tin had no authority to pledge. What is meant by "good faith" is not defined in the Indian Contract Act; but according to Section 3, Clause 20, General Clauses Act, 1897,

a thing shall be deemed to be done in good fai