JUDGMENT

Dunkley, J - The Township Court appears to have committed almost every possible error in the trial of this suit and the subsequent proceedings for the execution of the decree passed therein, and the question now for consideration is whether, and if so to what extent, these errors can be rectified on this application for revision. The suit was a suit for recovery of a loan as security for which certain movable properties had been hypothecated, and yet the Town-ship Court treated the suit throughout as if it were a suit on a mortgage of immovable property. Judgment in favour of the plaintiff-respondent was delivered on 18th August 1933, but no decree was drawn up until 4th October, when a decree in the ordinary form of a preliminary decree for the sale of mortgaged immovable properties was signed. This decree granted to the defendant-applicant a period of three months for "redemption" of the hypothecated properties by payment of the amount stated in the decree. On 20th November, on the application of the respondent, and without the issue of notice to the applicant, and in the latter's absence, a "final decree" for sale of the hypothecated properties was passed. Following on this decree, in spite of the protest of the bailiff of the Court, without issuing any notice to the applicant and without attaching the properties or publishing any proclamation of sale, the Judge ordered the properties to be sold on 30th November. The properties were actually sold on that date.

2. Now Order 34, Civil P.C., which deals with suits relating to mortgages of immovable property, was not applicable to the present suit, and moreover in every kind of execution, even in execution of a final decree for sale of mortgaged immovable property, a sale can only be held after a proclamation has been duly drawn up and published in the manner prescribed by Rules 66 and 67, Order 21, and the interval after publication of the proclamation prescribed by Rule 68 has elapsed. The correct decree to have passed in this suit was an ordinary money decree for the amount found to be due by the defendant-applicant to the plaintiff-respondent with a declaration of the respondent's lien over the hypothecated properties for the recovery of this amount. It is perfectly plain from the provisions of Rule 64, Order 21 that only attached property can be sold in execution, and consequently the first step to be taken in execution of such a decree as ought to have been passed in this case should be to issue a warrant of attachment of the hypothecated properties, on an application for execution by the respondent. When that warrant had been duly executed under the provisions of Rule 43, Order 21, then only could the properties be proclaimed for sale. The sale proclamation should be drawn up after notice to the applicant, as required by Rule 66, and published in the manner laid down in Rule 67, and the sale could only be held after the expiry of the period prescribed by Rule 68. The record of the execution proceedings would, of course, be separate from the record of the suit. (I notice that even now the record has not received a number in the execution register). Every one of these provisions has been infringed by the Township Court, and the proceedings were wholly irregular from beginning to end.

3. I am asked to set aside the illegal decrees passed by the Township Court and all proceedings subsequent to these decrees, and to pass a correct decree and leave it to the respondent to make a proper application for execution thereof. Now, it is a fundamental principle of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction that the High Court will not interfere in the exercise of its revisional powers where there is another and. certain remedy open to the aggrieved party under the law. The applicant might have appealed to the District Court to get these illegal decrees set aside, and had he done so it is inconceivable that his appeal would not have been successful. He did not see fit to exercise h