JUDGMENT

Dunkley, J - This appeal arises in connexion with a suit for administration of the estate of N.A.R. Arunachellam Chettyar, deceased, of Thaton. By a preliminary administration decree of this Court on appeal his estate is to be administered in accordance with the provisions of his will, the provisions of which are in effect that the present appellant Ma Fati, shall obtain two-thirds of the estate, and his adopted daughter, Ma Fatima, shall obtain the remaining one-third, but this one-third shall be subject to certain specific legacies in favour of the wives of the deceased. Ma Fatima is now dead. Respondent 1, Kalimuthu, is the husband of Ma Fatima, and respondents 2 and 3 are their minor children, and in the present litigation, respondent 1 is acting as their guardian-ad-litem. The other respondents are the persons, or the legal representatives of the persons, who are to obtain the specific legacies.

2. After the preliminary administration decree had been passed by this Court the case was remitted to the District Court of Thaton to make, the necessary enquiries as to the properties comprised in the estate and to pass a final decree. On 4th November 1933, the appellant and respondent 1 filed a petition of compromise in the District Court and asked that a final decree should be passed in accordance with the terms of that petition. Respondent 1, at the same time, by a separate petition, asked for leave to compromise the suit on behalf of respondents 2 and 3. The other respondents were served with notices of this petition and raised no objection to the compromise provided that their rights to their specific legacies were safeguarded, save that respondent 4, Ma Pwe, denied that she had received her specific legacy of Rs. 7,000. By his order dated 17th November 1933, the learned District Judge held that he could not pass a decree on this compromise petition for the following reasons, namely, (1) that certain conditions were imposed by the other respondents; (2) that Ma Pwe claimed that her legacy had not yet been paid; (3) that the parties had entirely ignored the question of giving remuneration to the Receiver appointed under the District Court's order of 23rd August; and (4) that the parties had made no mention in the petition of the question of paying the additional Court fees that might ultimately be found to be due. He thereupon ordered the parties to file a fresh petition remedying these defects and gave time for this purpose up to 23rd November 1933.

3. On 23rd November 1933, a fresh petition was not filed and he "dismissed" the petition of 4th November. His action was misconceived. This was an agreement between the appellant and the first three respondents for adjustment of the suit so far as they were concerned, that is for adjustment of the suit in part. It was plainly a lawful compromise, and, consequently, all that the learned District Judge could do was, under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, Civil P.C., to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith; subject to one condition that, so far as the two minor respondents were concerned, the leave of the Court was first obtained by respondent 1 to enter into the com. promise on their behalf, under the provisions of Order 32, Rule 7, Civil P.C. A petition for such leave was filed by respondent 1, and on this petition the Court should have considered whether the compromise was or was not in the interests of the minors: see Kalavati v. Chedi Lal (1895) 17 All. 531, Manohar Lal v. Jadunath Singh (1906) 28 All. 585 and Sakinbai v. Shrinibai A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 60. If he was satisfied that the petition of compromise was for the benefit of the minors, then he should have granted leave; if he was not so satisfied, he should have refused leave; and if leave was granted, then he had no option, but to record the compromise and to pass a decree in accordance therewith. Such a decree would be binding upon the appellant and the first three respondents, but not up