JUDGMENT

Dunkley, J - The two suits out of which these appeals arise were brought upon documents which are described in the plaints as being vaddi chattai, and which, as I construe them, are letters signed by the debtor and given by him to his creditor, acknowledging the amount of his indebtedness, and containing an unconditional promise to pay the amount on the demand of the creditor. They are duly stamped.

2. The first point that has been urged before me is that these documents are not promissory notes, and that the concurrent finding of the two lower Courts that they are promissory notes is wrong, but there had been practically no argument in support of this contention, and it is plain that these documents cannot be anything else but promissory notes. The main argument presented to me has been against the concurrent finding of the lower Courts that the defendant-appellant may not bring oral evidence in proof of an alleged agreement that the plaintiffs-respondents would take certain, lands in satisfaction of the amounts due on these two documents. This oral evidence has been rejected by the lower Courts under the provisions of Section 92, Evidence Act, but it is now argued on behalf of the appellant that Section 92, Evidence Act, has no application to the matter, because all that the appellant seeks to be allowed to prove is that there was a completed agreement whereby the plaintiffs-respondents agreed to accept certain lands in satisfaction of the amounts due on these two documents, and that therefore this plea in the written statements was a plea of discharge by payment, which could be proved by means of oral evidence. I have been referred to certain authorities under Sections 78 and 82, Negotiable Instruments Act, to the effect that by agreement of the parties payment of the amount due on a promissory note can be made in any other medium than money and no doubt, this is a perfectly correct statement. The appellant has therefore asked that the suits may be remanded for trial on the issue whether there was a completed agreement between the parties that the amounts due on these documents should be paid by the transfer of certain lands to the respondents, and I am asked to hold in this judgment that if it is proved that there was a completed agreement to this effect, then this agreement must operate as a discharge of the documents, and that therefore the suits brought thereon must fail.

3. It is however admitted that if the alleged agreement got no further than the stage of negotiation, then the decision of the lower Courts was correct, and the appellants would not be permitted to set up such an incomplete agreement as a bar to the suits which have been brought against them. It seems to me, however that the contention which has been raised on behalf of the respondents and which has been accepted by the lower Courts, viz., that evidence of such an agreement is inadmissible under the provisions of the last clause of proviso 4 to Section 92, Evidence Act, is correct. This clause says that when a contract is by law required to be in writing, then the existence of a distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify such, contract cannot be proved under any circumstances.

4. The documents in question being promissory notes, they were required by law to be in writing and it is quite clear as contended on behalf of the respondents that by their terms they require that payment of the amounts due thereon shall be made in money. The documents, in fact, state that principal and interest on a certain sum of money, mentioned in the documents, will be paid when required. Consequently an agreement that, instead of money being paid, payment shall be made in the form of a transfer of land is, on the face of it, an agreement modifying the terms of the original contracts.

5. For the appellant it is argued that he can, at any time, give oral evidence of the satisfaction of the amounts due on these documents, and in support of this proposition th