JUDGMENT

Aston, A J C - The following issue by consent has been tried as a preliminary issue viz.:

Is defendant 1 (a) liable on the hundi in suit (covers paras. 5, 6 and 10)?

2. A translation of the alleged hundi has been put in by consent; it reads as follows:

Seth Notandas Devi Dayal.

Sabzi Mandi, Delhi.

3. Written to Bhai Notandas Bhai Dipchandani (worthy of many respects may you remain happy always) by Bhai Notandas Devi Dayal from Delhi you will read his compliments. Further we have drawn on you one receipt for Rs. 1,000 in words rupees one thousand half of which is five hundred pay double of this in favour of Bhai Devi Dayal Bhai Chiman Lal of Chiman payable in the Port of Karachi to a respectable merchant dated 14th in words fourteenth January 1925.

4. Dustkhat Tirath Puj Pokerdasani. Mr. Kewalram for defendant 1 (a) has drawn attention to the fact that the signature does not purport to be that of the firm. The firm's name no doubt is disclosed in the instrument and Tirath Pokerdasani has added the word "Dustkhat" before his signature but he maintains that this is not enough to make the firm of Notandas Devi Dayal liable.

5. It is clear from the authorities that words which may be construed as merely description or as showing the designation of the person signing the instrument will not be sufficient to make a firm liable. In Dutton v. Marsh [1871] 6 Q.B. 361 certain directors of a joint stock company signed their names to a promissory note:

We the directors of the Isle of Man State Company Limited do promise to pay J.B. ?1,600 with interest at 6 per cent till paid, for Taluo received.

6. It was held notwithstanding the fact that the Company's seal was affixed that the words were insufficient to show that the note was signed on behalf of the company. This was followed by the Bombay High Court in Sitaram Krishna v. Chiman Lal Fatehchand A.I.R. 1928 Bom. 516. In that case the absence of words in the instrument to show that the parties were signing on behalf of the Company resulted in a similar finding. A similar decision was given in 25 T.L.R. 478 in spite of the fact that in addition to the word Director after each signature the name of the firm had been stamped on the cheque and a space had been left blank for the signature of the Secretary. Again in Subbanna v. Subbarayudu A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 390 certain guardians of a minor recited in the body of a promissory note that the debt in lieu of which the note was being executed was originally due by the father of the minor and they made themselves liable to pay on demand without discussing their representative character in the signature. It was held they were personally liable. Similarly in Manglulal v. Lister Antiseptic Dressing Co. Ltd. it was held that an endorsement, M and Sons, Managing Agents L.A. and Co. were merely description of M & Sons and did not bind L.A. & Co. And in 60 R.R. 729 where a firm consisted of J. B. and Order H. the partnership name being J.B. and C.H. made and endorsed a bill in the name of J.B. & Co. it was held that J.B. was not bound thereby. But in another case where the signature was as follows:

"J.H. Smethursts Laundry and Dye Works Limited, J.H. Smethurst, Managing Director" it was held that the name of the Company immediately against the signature of the director made it reasonably clear that the latter had signed as agent and not otherwise. See (1909) 1 K.B. 792. In Sadasukh Janki Das v. Kishan Persad A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 146, their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down the principle that the name of the person or firm to be charged upon a negotiable instrument must be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand, and further that the principal's name must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable.

7. In applying this test it is necessary to bear in