JUDGMENT

Mehta, A J C - The facts, leading up to the filing of this application by the plaintiffs under Section 151, Civil P.C., may briefly be noticed to start with. According to the plaint the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 11 entered into a partnership in 1925 for the purpose of manufacturing and selling salt at Karachi and other places in India under the name and style of "The Star Salt Manufacturing Co." and obtained a 20 years license from the Government of Bombay for the purpose commencing from 15th May 1927. Subsequently in March 1928 defendant 12 joined the business to supply the necessary capital and a deed of agreement was executed by which the shares of the various partners were duly settled. This agreement was varied subsequently in certain respects. The plaintiffs allege that as defendants 1, 2 and 12 have contravened the terms of the partnership agreement the necessity has now arisen to file this suit for dissolution of the partnership, for taking accounts, and for that purpose for appointment of a receiver. The parties arrived at a compromise and a consent preliminary decree was passed dissolving the partnership and directing accounts to be taken by Messrs. Chabaldas and Khanchand who were also appointed joint receivers to take charge of the partnership concern and sell the same with powers to manage the business in the interval. This decree was passed on 12th August last year. Subsequently the Court being moved in that behalf issued certain directions to the receivers on 21st January 1932. An auction of the suit property was advertised to take place on 12th March 1932. In the meanwhile the plaintiffs were advised that the partnership between the parties was illegal not being registered as required by Section 4, Companies Act 7 of 1913, and consequently filed this application under Section 151, Civil P.C., praying that the preliminary decree might be vacated thereby cancelling the order for the appointment of receivers and praying further that this suit should be dismissed on the ground that the partnership being illegal, the Court could not render any relief to the partners of the nature asked for in the plaint.

2. The matter has been argued at great length before me by Mr. Jhamatmal Valiram on behalf of the plaintiffs-applicants, by Mr. Dipchand Chandumal on behalf of defendants 1 to 11 and by Mr. Chabaldas Rochiram on behalf of defendant 12. Mr. Jhamatmal has un-blushingly admitted that although morally this application may be indefensible, his clients are perfectly entitled to take advantage of the technicalities of law as soon as they discovered they could do so. Messrs. Dipchand and Chabaldas who oppose any interference at this stage maintain that an application under Section 151, Civil P.C., cannot be entertained, that even assuming for the sake of argument that such an application is maintainable the plaintiffs are estopped from putting forth such a prayer and finally that where a decree has been passed by consent of parties the Court has no power to vary or alter it much less to vacate it out and out without the consent of the parties.

3. The first point to be determined is, assuming that the partnership is illegal, whether the present application which invokes the Court's inherent powers to substitute the consent decree by a decree dismissing the suit at once is not misconceived. Mr. Jhamatmal has principally relied on the rulings in Mewaram v. Bam Gopal and Peary Ghoudhury v. Sonoo Dass (1915) 27 IC 628 for the propositions respectively that in the case of an association not registered though required by law to be registered, none of its members can sue in a Court of law for partition; and that a Court has inherent powers to correct its own proceedings when it has been misled. He has also relied on Velchand v. Lieut. Liston AIR 1914 Bom 123 that even an award can be set aside to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. The case of Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh (1909) 36 Cal 198 is quoted by Mr.