Judicial review cannot interfere with electoral processes once they have commenced, and disqualification under applicable statutes is upheld.

1. The parties have agreed for the final disposal of the writ petition itself.

2. In this writ petition, the petitioner questions the rejection of his nomination for the post of Sarpanch of Thatikonda Gram Panchayat, Bhoothpur Mandal, Mahabubnagar District.

3. It is urged before me by Mr. Malla Reddy, learned senior counsel that the petitioner is presently working as incharge Sarpanch of the aforesaid Gram Panchayat on the resignation of the Sarpanch and the third respondent has issued an election notification for the post of the Sarpanch of the said Gram Panchayat on 1-6-1998 fixing the election schedule as under :

He submits that the nomination of the petitioner for the post of Sarpanch has been improperly rejected by the third respondent on the ground that he is disqualified within the meaning of S.19(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act'). He also submits that he has questioned the validity of S.19(3) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the third respondent - Election Officer has not held proper enquiry or given an opportunity to the petitioner to rebut the objections submitted by the other candidates, and as such, it violates the principles of natural justice. He lastly submits that the petitioner has already submitted a representation before the Government on 18-6-1998 for relaxation of the conditions under S.19(3) of the Act by invoking the third proviso thereto which is still pending.

4. Mr. Malla Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in S. Fakruddin v. The Govt. of A.P. , AIR 1996 AP 37 (FB) : 1995 (2) ALD 589, on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, wherein it is stated (at page 55; of AIR) :
"The preponderance of the judicial opinion and the view of the Supreme Court as expressed in various pronouncements leave no doubt that notwithstanding the bar that the bar is to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts and not to the extraordinary jurisdiction under the Art.226 of the Constitution and Art.136 thereof. It is not necessary for this Court, therefore, to pronounce that Art.243(o) is unconstitutional; simply it does not take away the power of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution to examine the validity of any law relating to the elections including the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to be made under Art.243 of the Constitution. As respects challenge to the election or any intermediary stage in case there is an alternative effective and independent mechanism provided the Court shall abstain to interfere except on jurisdictional errors i.e., when infirmity is based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non - compliance with Rules of natural justice and perversity. It will be so for the reason of prudence as well as deference to the legislation by the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power."
He also relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sk. Khasim Bee v. State Election Commr. , Hyd, AIR 1996 AP 324 : 1996 (2) ALD p. 106, wherein it is held (at page 335; of AIR) :
"If it has to be held that the constitutional Courts do not have the power of judicial review, the aggrieved party will be left without any remedy and the same is against the rule of law, which is basic form of democratic Government. No other Court, except the High Courts and the Supreme Court, are conferred with the power of judicial review. Even the Civil Court cannot decide the Constitutional validity of any statute or rules and it has to refer the same to the High