(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Sufficient cause - Inordinate delay - State seeking condonation of a significant delay in filing appeals - Subsequent change of law or overruling of a judgment by a different jurisdiction, or an order of another high court, does not constitute 'sufficient cause' to reopen settled lis between parties - Administrative lethargy and lack of bona fides cannot be cured by a liberal approach, irrespective of the status of the appellant as a government entity. (Paras 19, 25, 26, 28, 30, 36, 37)

(B) Appeal - Limitation - Practice and Procedure - Courts are not to act as surrogates for state laxity and lethargy - Statutory periods of limitation must be applied with all their rigour - Discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously, ensuring that a party acts with diligence and remains vigilant. (Paras 20, 34, 35)

Facts of the case:
Numerous writ appeals were filed by the government against various orders passed by single judges. All appeals suffered from substantial, inordinate delays ranging from hundreds to over a thousand days. The primary ground urged for condonation of delay was a subsequent order passed by another high court in different litigation, which the state claimed necessitated the filing of these appeals, despite the long passage of time and the settled nature of the previous litigation.

Findings of Court:
The Court held that the appellants failed to establish sufficient cause for the condonation of the inordinate delay. The explanation provided, based on a subsequent change of law or a decision by another jurisdiction, was insufficient as the lis between the parties had already attained finality. The Court emphasized that government bodies must operate with diligence, and the law of limitation applies to the state with the same rigour as to any other litigant.

Issues: Whether the subsequent change of law or an order of another high court constitutes 'sufficient cause' to condone inordinate delay in filing appeals, and whether the government is entitled to a more liberal approach in matters of limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent change of law or the overruling of a precedent does not provide a valid ground to reopen settled litigation. Administrative lethargy and bureaucratic red-tape fail to meet the standard of 'sufficient cause', and courts possess no equitable power to extend the limitation period where the statutory requirement of diligence is not met.

Result: Interlocutory applications for condonation of delay dismissed; Consequently, all writ appeals stand dismissed.