1. Appeal against interim injunction restraining publication of news reports linking plaintiff to criminal proceedings after discharge. (Para 1 , 3 )
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2025 Supreme(Online)(Del) 10775
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Chandrasekharan Sudha, J
IE ONLINE MEDIA SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED – Appellant
Versus
NITIN BHATNAGAR & ORS. – Respondent
FAO-346/2025
Important Points
The 'right to be forgotten' as a facet of Article 21 can override Article 19(1)(a) when digital dissemination of reports on exonerated individuals causes disproportionate harm. Such reliefs are distinct from libel and not governed by the one-year limitation period for defamation.
Subject
Civil Law - Right to be Forgotten
Act Referred
Civil Procedure Code, 1908: O.XLIII R.1(r), O.XXXIX R.1, O.XXXIX R.2
Limitation Act, 1963: Art.75
Constitution of India: Art.19(1)(a), Art.21
Limitation Act, 1963: Art.75
Constitution of India: Art.19(1)(a), Art.21
Headnote
(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 75 - Constitution of India - Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 - Right to be forgotten - Balance between freedom of press and right to dignity - Reliefs based on the right to privacy, dignity, and the right to be forgotten are distinct from claims for damages for libel and are not governed by the one-year limitation period prescribed under Article 75 of the Limitation Act (Para 12).
(B) Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(a) vs Article 21 - Freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and is delimited by an individual's right to dignity and reputation - In cases where continued dissemination of content results in disproportionate harm, the right to dignity under Article 21 must prevail over the freedom of the press (Para 13).
(C) Right to be Forgotten - Perpetual digital availability of reports associating an individual with criminal allegations, after the factual foundation has ceased to exist due to exoneration, causes enduring reputational harm - The right to be forgotten and the right to be left alone are inherent aspects of the right to privacy - Simple updates or clarifications at the bottom of articles may not neutralize the dominant narrative or continuing stigma of the original publication (Paras 14, 15, 16).
Facts of the case:
An individual was arrested in connection with alleged irregularities, leading to various news reports by digital platforms. Following the individual's discharge and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal complaint, the individual sought an interim injunction to restrain the further circulation of the reports and requested their de-indexing and de-referencing, invoking the right to be forgotten. The trial court granted the interim relief, which was challenged by a media house on the grounds of limitation and freedom of the press.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the suit was not barred by limitation as the prayers regarding the right to be forgotten were distinct from the claim for libel. It further held that the interim relief was narrowly tailored and necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the individual's dignity and professional prospects, as the public interest in the reports diminished upon exoneration.
Issues: (a) Whether the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, insofar as they are premised on the right to be forgotten, are liable to be defeated at the threshold on the ground of limitation; and (b) Whether the discretion exercised by the trial court in balancing the competing rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution warrants interference.
Ratio Decidendi: The right to be forgotten, as an extension of the right to privacy under Article 21, overrides the freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) when the continued online availability of reports on exonerated individuals creates a permanent stigma that outweighs the public interest in maintaining archival records.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
(B) Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(a) vs Article 21 - Freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and is delimited by an individual's right to dignity and reputation - In cases where continued dissemination of content results in disproportionate harm, the right to dignity under Article 21 must prevail over the freedom of the press (Para 13).
(C) Right to be Forgotten - Perpetual digital availability of reports associating an individual with criminal allegations, after the factual foundation has ceased to exist due to exoneration, causes enduring reputational harm - The right to be forgotten and the right to be left alone are inherent aspects of the right to privacy - Simple updates or clarifications at the bottom of articles may not neutralize the dominant narrative or continuing stigma of the original publication (Paras 14, 15, 16).
Facts of the case:
An individual was arrested in connection with alleged irregularities, leading to various news reports by digital platforms. Following the individual's discharge and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal complaint, the individual sought an interim injunction to restrain the further circulation of the reports and requested their de-indexing and de-referencing, invoking the right to be forgotten. The trial court granted the interim relief, which was challenged by a media house on the grounds of limitation and freedom of the press.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the suit was not barred by limitation as the prayers regarding the right to be forgotten were distinct from the claim for libel. It further held that the interim relief was narrowly tailored and necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the individual's dignity and professional prospects, as the public interest in the reports diminished upon exoneration.
Issues: (a) Whether the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, insofar as they are premised on the right to be forgotten, are liable to be defeated at the threshold on the ground of limitation; and (b) Whether the discretion exercised by the trial court in balancing the competing rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution warrants interference.
Ratio Decidendi: The right to be forgotten, as an extension of the right to privacy under Article 21, overrides the freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) when the continued online availability of reports on exonerated individuals creates a permanent stigma that outweighs the public interest in maintaining archival records.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- practice and procedure
- constitutional law
- tort
- media law
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Nachiket Joshi, Chanan Parwani
For the Respondents: Trideep P., S. Singh, Sakshi Jain, Nitesh Kumar Jha, Akshit Mago, E. Kashyap, Apar Gupta, Avanti Deshpande, Naman Kumar, Indumugi C., Mamta Rani Jha, Shruttima Ehersa, Rohan Ahuja, Aishwarya Debadarshini, Jahanvi Agarwal, Manu Seth
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Nachiket Joshi, Chanan Parwani
For the Respondents: Trideep P., S. Singh, Sakshi Jain, Nitesh Kumar Jha, Akshit Mago, E. Kashyap, Apar Gupta, Avanti Deshpande, Naman Kumar, Indumugi C., Mamta Rani Jha, Shruttima Ehersa, Rohan Ahuja, Aishwarya Debadarshini, Jahanvi Agarwal, Manu Seth
Table of Contents
2. Dispute over limitation for libel claims versus right to be forgotten and balance between press freedom and dignity. (Para 6 , 8 )
3. The right to be forgotten is a distinct right; continued online availability of articles after exoneration causes irreparable reputational harm. (Para 10 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 )
4. Right to dignity under Article 21 can outweigh press freedom under Article 19(1)(a) where continuing harm is disproportionate. (Para 13 , 14 , 16 )
5. Appeal dismissed, finding no infirmity in the trial court's interim order granting relief. (Para 18 )
6. Is a suit for relief based on the 'right to be forgotten' barred by the one-year limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act for libel?
No. Claims based on the right to be forgotten are distinct from defamation and are not governed by Article 75 of the Limitation Act. (Para 12 )
7. How should courts balance the freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a) with the right to dignity under Article 21 in cases of continued digital publication?
The right to dignity can outweigh press freedom where continued dissemination of content causes disproportionate harm to an individual, especially after exoneration. (Para 13 , 14 , 16 )
8. Does the addition of an update reflecting discharge neutralize the defamatory impact of an archived news article?
No. A brief clarification at the bottom does not necessarily neutralize the dominant narrative or continuing impact of the original publication. (Para 15 )
9. Is the balance of convenience to be assessed solely between the litigating parties in an interim injunction matter?
No. The exercise must be viewed through the prism of constitutional proportionality, considering the prejudice to the plaintiff's dignity versus inconvenience to the defendant. (Para 16 )
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. The present appeal under Order XLIII rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (the CPC), has been filed by defendant no. 2 in C.S. No. 510/2025 on the file of the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, aggrieved by the order dated 10.11.2025 by which the trial court allowed the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 herein.
2. In this appeal, the parties herein shall be referred to as described in the plaintiff.
3. Brief facts necessary for adjudicating the present appeal are: The plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions along with damages, inter alia, alleging that he is a professional banker with an unblemished career spanning over seventeen years, having worked with reputed international banking institutions, and that he enjoys a high standing and reputation in the society. In August 2023, the plaintiff was arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement (the ED) in connection with proceedings arising out of alleged irregularities relating to M/s Moser Baer India Limited, pursuant to which several news reports were published by various media houses and digital platforms, including the defendants, reporting his arrest and associating his name with the alleged offence.
3.1. According to the plaintiff, although the impugned news reports were published at different points of time, they continued to remain accessible on digital platforms and search engines, thereby perpetuating an impression of guilt against him. The jurisdictional court discharged the plaintiff by finding that no prima facie case had been made out and that there was no legally admissible evidence linking the plaintiff to the alleged offence vide order dated 17.08.2024. However, despite such discharge, the impugned articles and reports continue to be hosted, indexed and circulated rendering them misleading and defamatory and causing harm to his reputation, dignity and professional prospects. Hence, the plaintiff sought interim relief restraining the defendants from further publication or circulation of such content and directions of de-indexing and de-referencing of the impugned articles and URLs pendente lite.
3.2. The defendants on the other hand contended that there was no malice or intent to defame the plaintiff and that the right to freedom of speech and expression, as well as the public’s right to be informed, could not be curtailed by an order of prior restraint. The defendants also contended that in respect of certain publications, updates reflecting the plaintiff’s discharge had already been incorporated, thereby adequately balancing the reputational concerns. However, the plaintiff has approached the court by suppressing material facts and that no case of grant of interim injunction was made out, particularly in a defamation case, as the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were not satisfied.
4. The trial court, vide the impugned order, granted interim relief to the plaintiff by taking note of the plaintiff’s discharge in the criminal proceedings and concluded that the continuous availability and circulation of the impugned publications/articles/reports would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. The trial court also noted that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience lay in his favour because the injury to the reputation cannot be adequately compensated by damages.
5. Aggrieved, defendant no. 2 has preferred the present appeal.
6. The learned counsel for defendant no. 2/appellant submitted that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Limitation Act), which prescribes a period of one year from the date of publication for an action in libel. The learned counsel would submit that the first and second news reports were publ
