The discretionary power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be exercised when there is gross negligence, inaction, or lack of due diligence, as the law does not assist those who sleep on their rights.

ORAL ORDER

1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr. B.T. Rao waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent No.1.

2. The presence of respondent No.2 being Arbitrator is not required for adjudicating these matters.

3. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing.

4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Vikas V. Nair for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. B.T. Rao for respondent No.1.

5. Both these writ applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising out of common judgment and order dated 07/01/2023 passed by the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad City in Civil Misc Applications No. 172 & 178 of 2016 respectively.

6. The facts are common of both these writ applications and the issue germane is also common. So, to resolve the controversy involved in the present matters, the facts of Special Application No. 12057 of 2025 is considered.

Facts of the case

7. The petitioner herein is a statutory body incorporated under the Gujarat Industrial Development Act, 1962, whereas respondent No.1 is a Company registered under the Companies Act, who appears to have invoked arbitration against the petitioner whereby, respondent No.2 being Arbitrator passed an award in its favour.

7.1 The petitioner appears to have questioned such arbitral award by filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 1996’) being Civil Misc. Application Nos. 78 and 79 of 2004 respectively.

7.2 Both these applications came to be dismissed for default by the Court below vide its order dated 12/02/2013. The petitioner appears to have filed impugned applications being CMA Nos. 172 & 178 of 2016, by which sought for restoration of the aforesaid applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

7.3 It further appears from the record that both these impugned applications came to be initially allowed by the Court vide its common order dated 18.04.2018 thereby, the applications being CMA Nos. 78 and 79 of 2004 came to be restored back on its original file.

7.4 Respondent No.1 herein appears to have questioned the aforesaid common order passed by the Court below by filing writ application being Special Civil Application Nos. 10175 of 2018 and 10173 of 2018 before this Court. After hearing the parties, this Court vide its judgment and order dated 06/04/2022 quashed and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the Court in CMA Nos. 172 & 178 of 2016. Accordingly, both these impugned applications i.e. CMA Nos. 172 & 178 of 2016 restored back on its original file and matters were remanded back to the trial Court to decide afresh both these impugned applications.

7.5 On remand of the impugned applications, the trial Court having heard learned advocates for the respective parties found that there is inordinate, unexplained and long delay of 1074 days on part of the petitioner in filing restoration application. Having not found any sufficient cause in both these application, accordingly, the impugned applications came to be rejected by the Court vide its order dated 07/01/2023. Hence, the present writ applications.

Submission of the petitioner

8. Learned advocate Mr. Vikas Nair would submit that petitioner being statutory body fully depended upon its La