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2025 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 13763

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Easwaran S., J
GEORGE ANTONY – Appellant
Versus
ALBERT ANTONY – Respondent
RSA 233/2025



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Sri. Smt. A Parvathy Menon
For the Respondents: Sri. K.B Rajesh, Sri.K.B. Rekha

The court emphasized a liberal approach to condoning delays in property disputes, prioritizing substantive justice over procedural technicalities.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - The court must apply a liberal approach when considering applications for condonation of delay, especially in property disputes. The principle of 'sufficient cause' should be interpreted flexibly to ensure substantive justice is served. (Paras 11, 12, 13)

(B) Civil Procedure - Property Rights - The court emphasized that the right to challenge a decree should not be curtailed due to procedural delays, particularly when the final decree is yet to be passed. (Paras 8, 14)

Facts of the case:
The appellants filed an application to condone a delay of 444 days in appealing against a supplementary preliminary decree concerning property rights following the death of their mother. The first appellate court dismissed the application, citing insufficient explanation for the delay.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the District Court erred in not adopting a liberal approach and ruled that the appellants should be given an opportunity to contest the supplementary preliminary decree on merits, imposing costs on the appellants.

Issues: The main issues were whether the appellate court properly evaluated the merits of the appeal and if it correctly applied the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in its decision to dismiss the application to condone delay.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the principles governing the condonation of delay should be applied liberally in property disputes, allowing for a more justice-oriented approach to litigation.

Result: The order dismissing the application for condonation of delay was set aside, and the appeal was restored with costs imposed.

Table of Content
1. the appeal questions the dismissal of a delay condonation application. (Para 1 , 2)
2. counsel arguments focused on the court's discretion regarding delay. (Para 3 , 5)
3. the court discussed the significance of property rights and delay. (Para 6 , 7 , 8)
4. the court asserted a liberal approach to condoning delays. (Para 9 , 10 , 12 , 13)
5. the court restored the appeal, emphasizing justice. (Para 14)

JUDGMENT

The order of the District Court in dismissing an application to condone the delay of 444 days and consequently dismissing the appeal itself is called into question in this appeal. Has the District Court shown insensitiveness while dismissing the application for condonation of delay is the prime concern of this Court in this appeal. Further this Court is also called upon to consider the question whether the principles governing the construction of sufficient cause while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be applied “conscientiously” while considering a litigation touching the property rights of litigants.

2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:

The appellants preferred IA No.1 of 2023 in AS No.69 of 2023 for condonation of the delay of 444 days in filing the appeal.

nd rd The appellants are the 2 and 3 defendants, respectively, in a suit for partition. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit on 31.1.2006. Later, the mother of the appellants died, and therefore, an application seeking for the passing of a supplementary preliminary decree was preferred. By judgment and decree dated 24.2.2022, a supplementary preliminary decree was passed, wherein, the share of the mother was allotted to the st

1 respondent. Thereafter, the appellants preferred an application for passing of the final decree. While the said application was pending, the appellants felt that the passing of the supplementary preliminary decree would operate against the interest of the appellants and therefore, filed AS No.69 of 2023. By the time, the appellants preferred AS No.69 of 2023, there occurred a delay of 444 days in filing of the appeal. The respondents appeared and contested the application, stating that the application for condonation of delay, being a discretionary relief, the appellants have to show cause as to why the delay occurred. The averments in the application does not disclose sufficient cause, and therefore prayed for the dismissal of the st application. The 1 appellate court, while considering the application, found that the delay had not been properly explained and therefore dismissed the Interlocutory Application and consequently dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present second appeal is filed raising the following substantial questions of law:

1. Whether the First appellate Court was correct in dismissing the first appeal without considering the merits of the appeal by refusing to evaluate Ext.B1 settlement deed which is clouded with suspicious and surreptitious circumstances circumventing its execution and supervening factors which invalidate its authenticity and sanctity without appreciating the evidence.?

2. Whether the First appellate Court was correct in not following the principles and precedents of Sec 5 of the Limitation Act while dismissing the petition to condone delay filed by the appellants herein without going into the merits of the case?

3. Whether the Courts below were correct in accepting Ext B1 settlement deed by ignoring the contentions of the first respondent in his written statement of him owning the entire property by stating that the rest of the family members had lost their right by ouster and adverse possession.

3. Heard Sri. Smt. A Parvathy Menon, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri. K.B Rajesh, the learned counsel st appearing for the 1 respondent and Sri.K.B. Rekha, the learned nd counsel appearing for the 2 respondent.

4. The reason stated by the Appellant is that the appellant was not able to consult

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