1. Civil suit for immovable property — Regular First Appeal filed with 52-day delay — Application for condonation under Section 5, Limitation Act — Appeal dismissed on limitation. (Para 2 )
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2023 Supreme(SC) 938
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S. Bopanna, Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.
Raheem Shah & Anr. – Appellants
Versus
Govind Singh & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No.4628 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27901 of 2015)
Decided On : 24-07-2023
Important Points
The Court emphasized a liberal, justice-oriented approach to condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, holding that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities, especially when the delay is not inordinate, to ensure cases are decided on their merits.
Subject
Civil Law - Appeals
Act Referred
Headnote
DELAY CONDONATION - Civil Appeal - Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code - The court discussed the delay in filing the appeal and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. The court referred to Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963, emphasizing that the expression 'sufficient cause' is elastic and enables courts to apply the law in a manner that serves justice. The court cited the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., highlighting that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations when deciding on delay condonation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants filed an appeal against a judgment dismissing their suit due to a delay in filing. They sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Finding of the Court:
The court set aside the judgments passed by lower courts, condoned the delay, and restored the appeal for consideration on its merits.Issues:
Delay in filing appeal, application for condonation of delay.Ratio Decidendi:
The court emphasized that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations when deciding on delay condonation.Final Decision:
Judgments passed by lower courts were set aside, and the appeal was restored for consideration on its merits.Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates Appeared:
Mr. Vikas Upadhyay, Advocate, Mr. Nitin Gaur, Advocate, Mr. Kaustubh Anshuraj, Advocate, Mr. Kuber Boddh, Advocate, Mr. Arjun Singh Tomar, Advocate, Ms. Ankita Kashyap, Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. Abhishek Vikas, Advocate, Mr. Anshuman Shrivastava, Advocate, Mr. Abhijeet Shrivastava, Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocate, for the Respondent.
Mr. Vikas Upadhyay, Advocate, Mr. Nitin Gaur, Advocate, Mr. Kaustubh Anshuraj, Advocate, Mr. Kuber Boddh, Advocate, Mr. Arjun Singh Tomar, Advocate, Ms. Ankita Kashyap, Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. Abhishek Vikas, Advocate, Mr. Anshuman Shrivastava, Advocate, Mr. Abhijeet Shrivastava, Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocate, for the Respondent.
Table of Contents
2. Appellants contended the trial court judgment was not within their knowledge, justifying the delay in filing the appeal. (Para 3 )
3. Courts should adopt a justice-oriented, liberal approach toward condoning non-inordinate delays to ensure matters are decided on merits rather than technical grounds. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 )
4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be interpreted elastically to prefer substantial justice over technical considerations, especially when delay is not inordinate. (Para 4 )
5. Judgments of the High Court and lower Appellate Court set aside — delay condoned — appeal restored for decision on merits. (Para 7 , 8 )
6. What is the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
It enables courts to do substantial justice by disposing of matters on merits. The term sufficient cause is elastic, allowing courts to apply the law meaningfully to serve the ends of justice. (Para 4 )
7. How should courts approach the requirement to explain every day's delay in condonation applications?
Courts should avoid a pedantic approach and instead apply the doctrine in a rational, common-sense, and pragmatic manner, recognizing that litigants rarely benefit from lodging appeals late. (Para 4 )
8. Should technical considerations prevail over substantial justice in condonation of delay?
No. When substantial justice and technical considerations conflict, substantial justice should be preferred, as the opposing party has no vested right in injustice resulting from non-deliberate delay. (Para 4 )
9. Is there a presumption that delay in filing an appeal is intentional?
No. There is no presumption that delay is caused deliberately, by culpable negligence, or by mala fides; rather, the litigant faces a serious risk by resorting to delay. (Para 4 )
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the appeal papers.
2. Respondent No.1 herein is the plaintiff in the original suit bearing Civil Suit No.3 A/02. The suit was decreed by the trial court through its judgment dated 01.10.2005. The appellants herein who were the defendants No. 1 and 2 in the suit filed a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code assailing the said judgment. Since there was delay of 52 days in filing the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed seeking condonation of delay. The lower Appellate Court through its judgment dated 08.10.2010 had dismissed the appeal bearing Civil Appeal No.35A/2005 on the ground of limitation holding that the delay has not been properly explained and had consequently dismissed the appeal. Against the said judgment, the appellants were before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a Second Appeal bearing No.1185/2010. The Second Appeal has been dismissed by the High Court through its judgment dated 16.04.2015 on the ground that there is no question of law for consideration.
3. It is in that light, the appellants are before this Court in this appeal. At the outset, having taken note that the contention in the appeal before the lower Appellate Court was that the judgment was not in the knowledge of the appellants herein, that aspect of the matter was required to be kept in view by the lower Appellate Court since the appellants in fact had not taken effective part except filing written statement. When there was delay of only 52 days in filing the appeal and furthermore when the parties were litigating with regard to the right over immovable properties, the substantial rights were to be decided between the parties. The delay could have been condoned and the appeal could have been decided on merits.
4. This Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held as hereunder:
'The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
