Suspension of conviction in criminal cases, especially for corruption, is only permissible in exceptional circumstances where irreversible harm can be shown.

1. The scope of suspension of the conviction traceable to S.389, CrPC, as also, the parameters to be considered for the same is the issue involved in this miscellaneous application.

2. The above application is preferred under S.389(1), read with S.482, of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to suspend the conviction of the applicant as per the judgment impugned in the afore referred appeal. A separate application, Crl.M.A.No.1/2024, was filed to suspend the execution of the sentence, which has already been allowed.

3. Heard Sri.John Sebastian Ralph.V, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri.Sreelal N.Warrier, learned Special Public Prosecutor (C.B.I) on behalf of the respondent.

4. Although the language employed in S.389 does not specifically refer to suspension of the judgment of conviction, the legal position governing the power in this regard is no more res integra. The expression "the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended" has been interpreted to hold that S.389(1) affords adequate power to suspend the order of conviction, as well. The earliest exposition of the law in this regard can be found in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang ( 1995 (2) SCC 513 ). The specific question considered by the Honourable Supreme Court is whether the power under S.389(1) could be invoked to stay the conviction. The Honourable Supreme Court held that it see no reason to place a narrow interpretation to S.389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction. It was also found that, if the power is not found in S.389(1) of the Code, the High Courts can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under S.482 to stay the conviction.

5. As regards the exposition of law in Rama Narang (supra), learned Special Public Prosecutor (C.B.I.) has serious reservation. Learned Special Public Prosecutor would first invite the attention of this Court to S.389(1) of the CrPC, which is extracted here below:
"389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail. -
(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond."
Emphasising on the language employed being "execution of the sentence or order appealed against", learned Public Prosecutor would submit that, the term 'execution' would apply to the sentence and also to the order appealed against, both, more so when there is no comma separating the execution of the sentence from the order appealed against. In other words, what is being suspended under S.389 is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order appealed against. The order appealed against, by no stretch of imagination can be, construed as an "order of conviction", as has been held in Rama Narang (supra). Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that the expression "order of conviction" is an anathema. A perusal of S.235, as also, 255 of the Code would clearly indicate that the Judge has to pronounce a judgment of acquittal or conviction, as the case may be at the first instance; and if the accused is convicted, the Judge has to hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass a sentence on him. It could thus be seen that, the judgment in a criminal case essentially consists of a 'judgment of conviction' and an 'order of sentence', wherefore, the concept of 'order of conviction' as found in paragraph no.19 of Rama Narang (supra), does not reflect the correct legal position. More