A detention order under the PITNDPS Act is valid if the authority satisfies three criteria regarding the likelihood of bail, and potential for subsequent prejudicial activity, irrespective of the detenu's judicial custody status.

JUDGMENT

Jobin Sebastian, J.

The petitioner herein is the wife of one Mirshad P. ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 30.07.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS Act for brevity).

2. The records reveal that, on 29.04.2025, a proposal was submitted by the Deputy Excise Commissioner, Kozhikode, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PIT NDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, three cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.16/2025 of the Excise Enforcement and Anti- Narcotic Special Squad, Kozhikode, alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act .

3. We heard Sri. Firdouse K. K., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

4. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another , [1991 (1) SCC 128] , the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, such a satisfaction is not entered into by the jurisdictional authority while passing the Ext.P1 detention order. The learned counsel would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. The learned counsel urged that there occurred an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. According to the counsel, out of the three cases relied upon, in the first two cases no contraband was seized from the conscious possession of the detenu, and therefore the jurisdictional authority ought not to have taken those cases into account while arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction for passing Ext. P1 detention order. The learned counsel further submitted that the detenu got bail in the last case registered against him on the ground of illegalities in the arrest. According to the learned counsel, this fact was not duly or seriously considered by the jurisdictional authority, which proceeded to pass the Ext. P1 detention order in a casual manner. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Ext. P1 detention order was issued by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all procedural requirements and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Public Prosecutor contended t