Specific performance is a discretionary equitable remedy requiring consistent readiness and willingness. A plaintiff who delays filing a suit for several years after the agreed performance period and notice, without adequate cause, fails to satisfy the mandatory requirements of the law, rendering them ineligible for such relief.

Headnote:(A) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Sections 16(c) and 20 - Suit for specific performance - Readiness and willingness - Mandatory requirement - Mere financial capacity is insufficient if the plaintiff displays lack of mental willingness by failing to take timely legal action despite clear indications of evasion - The burden of proof to establish readiness and willingness at all relevant stages, from the date of the agreement to the date of the decree, rests solely upon the plaintiff. (Paras 14, 18, 22, 25)

(B) Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 54, Schedule I - Date fixed for performance - The definition of 'date fixed for performance' is a crystallized notion - Where a specific timeline is agreed upon, failure to initiate legal action within the stipulated period, followed by inordinate delay in filing the suit, reflects negatively on the plaintiff's conduct. (Paras 13, 36, 39)

Facts of the case:
An agreement for the sale of property was executed with a stipulated period for performance. The plaintiff alleged that the vendors failed to proceed with the registration and instead demanded additional consideration. The plaintiff issued a legal notice after the expiry of the agreed timeline but delayed filing the suit for several years, relying on asserted informal communications and personal considerations for the vendors. The trial and appellate courts initially decreed the suit; the current appeal challenges these findings, particularly regarding the plaintiff's lack of due diligence and readiness.

Findings of Court:
The Court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness. Despite having the financial means, the plaintiff's conduct—waiting years after issuing a pre-suit notice and only approaching the court at the absolute end of the limitation period—was inconsistent with the requirement of acting with reasonable promptitude. The argument that personal sympathy towards the vendors justified these delays was rejected as unsubstantiated and illogical.

Issues: Whether the plaintiff established 'readiness and willingness' as mandated by law throughout the entire period, and whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable given the significant delay in filing despite knowledge of the alleged refusal to perform.

Ratio Decidendi: The entitlement to specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief that requires the plaintiff to act with continuous readiness and willingness. Inordinate delay in initiating legal proceedings, particularly after the expiry of the stipulated performance period and specific legal notices, signifies a lack of willingness, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to discretionary relief, regardless of financial capacity.

Result: Second Appeal allowed; judgment and decree of the lower courts set aside; suit dismissed.

JUDGMENT

The defendants, in a suit for specific performance, having suffered concurrent findings before the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are the appellants. The Second Appeal was admitted by this Court on 29.11.2019, on the following three substantial questions of law:

“(A) Whether the Courts below committed a serious error in law in granting the equitable and discretionary relief of specific performance in favour of the respondent without adverting to the very scope and purport of Sections 16 & 20 of the Specific Relief Act, especially the suit has been laid on the last date of limitation for filing the suit and more so, no plausible explanation was offered for the delay?

(B) Have not Courts below committed an error in granting the discretionary equitable relief of specific performance without adverting that the suit has been laid on the last date of limitation ie., After 36 months from the date of performance and 33 months from the date of issuance of legal notice, under Ex.A.2, especially the time fixed for performance under Ex.A.1 is only three months?

(C) Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting the defence as well as the evidence of the appellants / defendants relating to the circumstances under which Ex.A.1, the sale agreement was executed, merely relying on Section 92 of the Evidence Act even without adverting to the very proviso to the said section which clearly permits as party to a contract to contend that the agreement entered was intended only as a security for the loan transaction and not actually a sale agreement?”

2.I have heard Mr.T.Arul, for Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr.K.Ravi Anantha Padmanathan, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Paraloga Vignesh, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent.

3.For the sake of convenience, the parties are described as per their rank before the trial Court.

4.Pending Second Appeal, C.M.P.(MD)No.13675 of 2025, had been taken out by the respondent / plaintiff, for adducing additional evidence. The additional documents which are sought to be produced are pertaining to a similar agreement entered into by the first defendant in respect of the southern portion of the suit property and to drive home the fact that the first defendant suffered an ex-parte decree in a suit for specific performance filed by the agreement holder in respect of the said southern portion and that not only sale deed came to be executed, but possession was also taken over by the said purchaser / agreement holder and that the attempts to set aside the ex-parte decree were also unsuccessful upto this Court. The said application was also taken up for arguments along with the Second Appeal.

5.The brief facts that are necessary for adjudicating the substantial questions of law framed by this Court as extracted hereinabove are as follows:

5.1.The suit property was originally belonging to the husband of the first defendant, one Raju, he having purchased the same on 09.08.1985, in and by registered sale deed. He died intestate leaving behind the defendants, who are his wife and daughter, who became entitled to the suit property absolutely and equally. The first defendant, for herself and as guardian of the minor second defendant entered into the sale agreement with the plaintiff on 07.08.1997, for selling the suit property for a consideration of Rs.7 Lakhs. A sum of Rs.4,50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff as advance. Three months time was fixed for completion of the sale transaction. The plaintiff, contending that despite repeated requests, the first defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed and that even when the entire balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- was tendered on 01.02.1998, the first defendant refused to receive the same and instead demanded an additional consideration of Rs.3 Lakhs, which was not agreeable to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contr

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2026 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 65629

Cases Referred (6)