Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a showing of 'sufficient cause' based on reasonableness; inordinate delay caused by gross negligence or inaction (the 'sleeping litigant' doctrine) cannot be condoned through a mere liberal approach.

Heard through video conferencing.

The review petitioner has filed an application, being I.A. No. 11579 of 2025, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of a delay of 589 days in filing the review petition.

It is submitted on behalf of the review petitioner that he is a rustic villager who was informed belatedly, in the month of July, 2024, by his local counsel, upon being so apprised by the counsel engaged by him before the High Court. Thereafter, on the advice of the local counsel, the petitioner instituted a Civil Suit before the learned Trial Court, bearing Case No. RCS A 50/2024, seeking a declaration and permanent injunction, as in the earlier suit filed by the respondent there was no issue relating to the Will and adoption, and no counter-claim or relief had been sought by the petitioner.

Upon service of notice in the aforesaid suit filed by the petitioner, the respondent preferred an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC seeking dismissal of the suit. Thereafter, as advised by the local counsel, a legal opinion was obtained from the counsel who had appeared in the Second Appeal at Indore. The said counsel advised filing a review of the judgment dated 12.03.2024 passed by this Court in the Second Appeal, on the ground that the issue of limitation had been raised, and that there was no challenge to the Will and adoption in the respondent’s suit, though such issues were raised and argued. It is thus contended that the delay of 589 days in filing the review petition occurred for the aforesaid reasons. Hence, it is prayed that the delay, being bona fide and unintentional, and not causing prejudice to the respondents, deserves to be condoned.

The aforesaid submissions made in the application suggest that instant case is a classic case where the petitioner in fact has woken up from a deep slumber of a long period of 589 days. Explanation offered by way of the instant skeleton application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can hardly be said to be one showing sufficient cause preventing the petitioner to file Review Petition within limitation. The petition is hopelessly time barred by 589 days. Moreover, the averments contained in the application for delay are hypothetical and vague, hence, sufficient cause has not been shown for delay in filing the petition.

Law as regards scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

The law with respect to sleeping litigant has been considered by the Court in catena of cases. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, has held as under :-

"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate th