1. Reference for criminal contempt against police officials for statements made during an inquiry under Section 166-A IPC. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 )
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2026 Supreme(Raj) 561
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
FARJAND ALI, YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT, JJ.
In Re, Bhilwara (Raj.) - Petitioner
Versus
Dilip Kumar Saini – Respondent
D.B. Criminal Contempt Petition No. 3 of 2019
Decided On : 17-03-2026
Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Sajjan Singh Rathore, AAG
For the Respondent: Present-in-Person, Mr. Dilip Kumar Saini, Additional S.P., Mr. Bhura Ram Khillery, CO, Mr. Megha Ram, Ms. Saroj JakharMandalgarh, Mr. Nathu Singh
For the Petitioner: Mr. Sajjan Singh Rathore, AAG
For the Respondent: Present-in-Person, Mr. Dilip Kumar Saini, Additional S.P., Mr. Bhura Ram Khillery, CO, Mr. Megha Ram, Ms. Saroj JakharMandalgarh, Mr. Nathu Singh
Criminal contempt protects the institutional authority of the court, not the personal prestige of a judicial officer. Bona fide grievances against a presiding officer, expressed during an official inquiry or through proper channels in good faith, do not constitute criminal contempt.
Headnote:(A) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Sections 2(c), 6 and 12 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 166-A - Criminal contempt - Statements made during an official inquiry - Whether narration of grievances by subordinate officers regarding the conduct of a judicial officer before a superior officer amounts to criminal contempt - The law of contempt is intended to safeguard the administration of justice and the institutional authority of the court, not to protect the personal prestige or ego of an individual presiding officer (Para 13) - Statements made in an official inquiry, not in a public forum, and in response to queries to explain conduct, do not satisfy the ingredients of criminal contempt as they do not tend to scandalize the court as an institution or obstruct the administration of justice (Paras 7.1, 12.3 and 16.1). (Paras 12, 13, 16)
(B) Complaint against Presiding Officers of Subordinate Courts - Section 6 of the Act of 1971 - Statements made in good faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate court to the High Court or another subordinate court are protected and do not amount to contempt - This ensures accountability within the judicial system by allowing bona fide grievances to be raised without fear of contempt proceedings. (Paras 12.9, 12.10)
(C) Judicial Restraint - Contempt jurisdiction is extraordinary and punitive and must be exercised with utmost circumspection - Fair and reasonable criticism of judicial functioning or expression of grievances through lawful channels is permissible in a democratic polity and does not attract penal consequences unless there is a deliberate attempt to run down the institution. (Paras 14, 14.6)
Facts of the case:
A reference was made to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against police officials based on statements recorded during an official inquiry. The inquiry concerned alleged failures in investigation under Section 166-A of the IPC. During the proceedings, the officials alleged that the presiding officer of the subordinate court had behaved improperly, used abusive language, and harboured resentment against them due to previous complaints lodged with the vigilance department.
Findings of Court:
The statements were made within the confines of an official inquiry and were not published in the public domain. They were made in response to queries from a superior officer to explain the circumstances of an investigation. Such narration of grievances regarding the personal behavior of a judicial officer does not amount to scandalizing the court as an institution.
Issues: Whether statements made by subordinate police officers during an official inquiry, alleging misconduct and bias by a presiding officer of a subordinate court, constitute criminal contempt.
Ratio Decidendi: Criminal contempt requires an act that scandalizes the court, lowers its authority, or obstructs the administration of justice. A clear distinction exists between the individual presiding officer and the court as an institution. Protecting a judicial officer's personal sensibilities against fair criticism or bona fide complaints made in good faith, as protected under Section 6 of the Act of 1971, falls outside the scope of criminal contempt.
Result: Contempt reference dismissed and rule discharged.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- contempt of court
-
crime and sentencing
-
offences against the state
-
offences by public servant
- public servant disobeying direction under law (Para 15)
-
offences by public servant
-
offences against the person
- rape
-
offences against the state
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Contemnors asserted statements made during official inquiry without intent to scandalize court or interfere with justice. (Para 5 )
3. Statements were personal grievances during an inquiry; not public or intended to scandalize the court as an institution. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 )
4. Criminal contempt requires deliberate act scandalizing the court; personal grievances in official inquiries do not attract it. (Para 12 , 14 , 16 , 17 )
5. Contempt reference dismissed; rule discharged for not attracting ingredients of criminal contempt under Section 2(c), Act of 1971. (Para 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 )
6. What constitutes criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?
Publication or act that scandalizes or lowers court authority, prejudices judicial proceedings, or obstructs administration of justice, with deliberate intent or manifest tendency. (Para 12 , 14 , 17 )
7. What is the distinction between criticism of a judicial officer's personal conduct and an attack on the court as an institution?
Personal criticism without tendency to interfere with justice or scandalize the institution does not constitute criminal contempt; the law protects the court, not the individual officer. (Para 13 )
8. Can statements made during an official inquiry be considered criminal contempt?
Statements made in response to queries during an official inquiry, without publication or intent to scandalize, do not ordinarily constitute criminal contempt. (Para 16 )
9. What is the standard for exercising criminal contempt jurisdiction?
It is extraordinary and punitive, to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the act poses a real, substantial, and imminent threat to administration of justice. (Para 14 , 17 , 18 )
ORDER :
Farjand Ali, J.
Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commisioner, Ex parte Blackburn (No.2) observed that:-
Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
INTRODUCTION
1. This Court has received the present matter through an official communication transmitted by the Registry of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, in the form of a U.O. Note. The said U.O. Note encloses a letter dated 14.08.2019 forwarded by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, along with an application dated 08.08.2019 addressed by the Presiding Officer, Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara (hereinafter to be referred as “Presiding Officer”), accompanied by relevant documents and enclosures.
2. As per the contents of the aforesaid communications, it is stated that during the course of hearing of Criminal Case arising out of FIR No. 130/2019 registered at Police Station Mandalgarh for offences under Sections 376, 420, 389, 120-B, 166-A and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred as “IPC”), the Presiding Officer noticed certain acts which allegedly constituting an act of contempt of court. Consequently, a reference seeking initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1971”) against the non- applicants named therein was made and transmitted through the proper administrative channel. The original reference along with supporting material has thus been placed before this Court for information and for taking further action, as deemed appropriate in accordance with law.
2.1 The matter has been taken up. Notices were issued and the same stand served. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard.
BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS
3. The present proceedings arose out of allegations that certain police officials (present contemnors) have committed criminal contempt of court on account of statements made by them during an inquiry conducted by an Additional Superintendent of Police.
3.1 The factual matrix, in brief, is that in the principal case allegations were levelled against the accused, namely Mahaveer Prasad Acharya, that he had established relationship with the complainant on the basis of a promise to marry. There are further allegations in the FIR No. 130/2019 against the then SHO, Shri Bhura Ram Khillery, to the effect that victim “M” went to the Police Station to lodge the FIR but the needful was not done instead she was behaved unruly and subjected to abuse. Whereupon, she sent a report to SP Bhilwara on 15.04.2019, the copies of which were sent to DIG, DG, CM, Home Minister and Women Commission, still the FIR was not lodged. Upon receiving the complaint, the learned Magistrate sought a report from Police Station and wherefrom it was informed that no such report got lodged at the instance of the victim in this fact situation.
3.2 The learned Magistrate, upon due consideration of the material placed on record, has proceeded to pass an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., whereby it has been observed that, prima facie, the allegations levelled disclose commission of cognizable offences. It has been specifically noted that offences punishable under Sections 376, 420, 389 and 120-B of the IPC are made out against Mahaveer Prasad Acharya. Furthermore, the learned Magistrate has also recorded a prima facie satisfaction that the role of the concerned SHO is not beyond scrutiny, and that offences under Sections 166-A, 509 and 120-B IPC are also disclosed against him. Consequently, in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., a direction has been issued to the SHO concerned to register the FIR and undertake investigati
