The period of limitation for challenging an arbitral award under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, commences only upon the delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party himself, as mandated by Section 31(5), and not to the counsel.

GIST :

HEAD NOTE :

Cases referred :

1. (2011) 4 SCC 616

2. (2012) 9 SCC 496

3. (2011) 4 SCC 616

4. (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 239

5. (2021) 7 Supreme Court Cases 657

6. AIR 2015 Supreme Court 3411

7. (2012) 6 SCC 384

8. AIR 2015 SC 3411

9. (2001) 8 SCC 470

10. (2019) 2 SCC 455

11. (2020) 10 SCC 654

12. (1987) 2 SCC 107

13. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 572

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy)

1. This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioners aggrieved by the order dated 05.02.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Nalgonda, in I.A. No.1146 of 2016 in O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016. By the Impugned Order, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioners’ application filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the Act”), wherein they had sought condonation of delay of twenty-seven (27) days in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act, for setting aside the arbitral award passed under the National Highways Act, 1956.

2. This case raises questions concerning the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, the scope of delivery of signed copy of the award under Section 31(5) of the Act, and the approach to be adopted by Courts while considering applications for condonation of delay in challenging arbitral awards.

I. BRIEF FACTS

3. The factual backdrop to the present revision is as follows:

(a) The petitioners’ agricultural lands were acquired for widening of National Highway No.65 (earlier No.9) at Suryapet.

(b) Pursuant thereto, an award dated 03.06.2010 in Case No.C/3125/2009 was passed, awarding compensation which, according to the petitioners, was grossly inadequate.

(c) Being dissatisfied, the petitioners sought reference, whereupon the Arbitrator (respondent No.3) passed Award No. G2/6452/2010 dated 27.04.2015, marginally enhancing the compensation.

(d) The petitioners contend that despite the award having been passed in April 2015, they were never served a signed copy until 04.05.2016.

(e) On receipt of the signed copy, the petitioners filed O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 under Section 34 of the Act, on 30.08.2016, accompanied by I.A. No.1146 of 2016 for condonation of 27 days’ delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act.

(f) The Trial Court, however, dismissed the condonation application, holding that since the award had been dispatched to the petitioners’ advocate in May 2015, limitation commenced from that date. On that basis and by presumption of service, the Trial Court concluded that the petition was hopelessly time-barred.

(g) Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, the petitioners have approached this Court in the present Revision.

II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:

a) Submissions on behalf of the petitioners:

4. The following arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioners:

i) The petitioners emphasize that limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act is triggered only upon delivery of a signed copy of the Award to the party himself, as mandated by Section 31(5) of the Act. Further, service upon counsel does not satisfy this statutory requirement.

ii) The petitioners assert that they received the signed copy of the Award only on 04.05.2016. Thus, the peti