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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Rajiv Shakdher, J
Shyam Prasada – Appellant
Versus
Dayavati – Respondent
CS (OS) 1113/2008|CS (OS) 3452/2014|Test. Cas. 23/2014
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Manish Vashisht, Sameer Vashisht, Manashwy Jha, Urvi Kapoor
For the Respondents: A.K. Singla, Bhaskar Tiwari, Jeevesh Nagrath, Chandan Dutta, Rikky Gupta, Sanjay Sood
Nomination does not convey beneficial title to a nominee, and a female Hindu cannot claim absolute ownership without a pre-existing right in properties acquired after the commencement of the Act. Co-heirs do not forfeit their inheritance by allowing a family member to hold property for convenience.
Headnote:(A) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 8 and Section 14(1),(2) - Indian Succession Act, 1925 - Sections 2(h) and 63. - Partition and Inheritance - Nomination vs. Testamentary Disposition - A nominee does not acquire a beneficial interest in the property but merely acts as a trustee for legal heirs. Nomination under society bye-laws without fulfilling requirements of a Will cannot be treated as a testamentary disposition. (Paras 15, 16).
(B) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 14 - Pre-existing right - For a female Hindu to claim absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Act, she must be possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force, either directly or under a pre-existing right like maintenance. Mere possession or construction of a superstructure with own funds does not create a pre-existing right in the land beneath, especially if the property was not allotted at the time of the Act's commencement. (Paras 18.2, 18.8).
(C) Limitation Act - Article 58, 59, 106 - Suit for partition - A suit for partition by a co-owner is not barred by limitation merely based on the passage of time or the recording of a lease for convenience. Acts of convenience among co-heirs do not amount to surrender of title. (Paras 22, 23, 24).
Facts of the case:
Several suits were filed regarding the partition of an immovable property. The primary dispute involved whether the heirs were entitled to a share in the father's portion of the property, despite a fresh lease being executed in favor of the mother alone after his death, and whether this act constituted a relinquishment of rights. The defendants claimed the property was held exclusively by the mother due to a family arrangement, nomination, and pre-existing rights.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the father died intestate, and his share devolved upon his Class I heirs. The mother's inclusion as a joint lessee and subsequent sole lessee was for convenience, not an act of surrendering rights by other heirs. The nomination did not act as a Will, and the mother's Will was proven valid for her share only, but not for the father's portion.
Issues: 1. Whether the father's interest in the property passed to the mother exclusively via nomination. 2. Whether the lack of objection by other heirs to the mother's name being on the lease constituted relinquishment of rights. 3. Whether the suit for partition was barred by limitation. 4. Whether the mother acquired absolute ownership under the Hindu Succession Act.
Ratio Decidendi: Nomination does not confer title. A female Hindu's possession only matures into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) if she had a pre-existing right in the property at the commencement of the Act. Without proof of such a right or a valid registered relinquishment, co-owners of an intestate's estate retain their legal shares. No limitation applies to co-owners seeking partition of ancestral inheritance.
Result: Suit for partition decreed; plaintiffs and defendants declared entitled to 1/6th share each in the father's portion of the property.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. overview of multiple related partition suits and testamentary proceedings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. evidence analysis concerning property ownership, joint lease, and lack of relinquishment. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14) |
| 3. nomination in society records does not constitute a valid will. (Para 15 , 16) |
| 4. no-objection certificates for lease execution do not transfer title or establish maintenance rights. (Para 17 , 18) |
| 5. proof and validity of testamentary documents executed by the deceased mother. (Para 19 , 20 , 21) |
| 6. partition suits among co-owners are not barred by limitation. (Para 22 , 23 , 24) |
| 7. final orders directing partition of shares among legal heirs. (Para 25 , 26 , 27 , 28) |
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.:
Preface: -
1. The captioned suits and the testamentary case are inter-related and involve members of the family of one, Mr. Savitri Prasada and, hence, will be decided by a common judgement. For the sake of convenience, the genealogy of Mr. Savitri Prasada is shown hereafter.
2. Thus, the parties will be referred hereafter by their names unless the context requires otherwise. Furthermore, Mrs. Dayavati and Mr. Arun Prasada will be collectively referred to as the contesting defendants while the Legal Representatives [in short “LRs”] of Mr. Aditya Prasada, LRs of Mrs. Sudha Garg, and LRs of Mrs. Rekha Garg will be referred to as the supporting defendants.
3. The two suits i.e. CS (OS) 1113/2008 [in short “2008 suit”] and CS (OS) 3452/2014 [in short “2014 suit”] seek, essentially, the partition of an immovable property described as plot number 12, Anand Lok, New Delhi [hereafter referred to as the “subject property”].
3.1. The reason that two suits have been filed qua the same immovable property is on account of the fact that when the first suit was filed in 2008, partition was sought of a portion of the subject property i.e. 396.65 sq. yards out of a total of 793.30 sq. yards [hereafter referred to as the “suit property”]. The partible portion i.e. the suit property, according to Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada i.e. the plaintiff in the 2008 suit, then, was the 50% share which was co-owned by Mr. Savitri Prasada along with his wife Mrs. Dayavati.
3.2. However, during the pendency of the 2008 suit, Mrs. Dayavati expired, which then led to the institution of the second suit i.e. the 2014 suit to seek partition of the remaining 50% of the subject property that fell to her share.
3.3. Since Mrs. Dayavati had executed a Will dated 09.11.1992 whereby the subject property, in its entirety, was bequeathed in favour of one of her sons i.e. Mr. Arun Prasada, he instituted the third proceeding which is the testamentary case no. 23/2014 [hereafter referred to as the "testamentary case”].
3.4. Apart from the prayer for partition, in the 2008 suit, whereby, Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada claims 1/7th share out of his deceased father share admeasuring 396.65 sq. yards i.e. the suit property, there is also a prayer for rectification of a conveyance deed dated 27.03.2000 – this conveyance deed was executed by the Delhi Development Authority [DDA] in favour of Mrs. Dayavati after the subject property was converted from leasehold to freehold.
3.5. The rectification sought, then, was for inclusion of the name of Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada and his siblings i.e. defendant nos. 2 to 6 in the 2008 suit along with Mrs. Dayavati; who was alive, at that juncture. Besides this, a prayer was also made, in the very same suit, for a decree for the rendition of accounts against Mrs. Dayavati and Mr. Arun Prasada in respect of shares, debentures, FDRs, bank accounts possessed by the deceased Mr. Savitri Prasada and a consequent share in the same.
3.6. Since on 14.02.2014, Mr. Arun Prasada had moved the testamentary case in which he sought probate of the Will dated 09.11.1992 and the codicil dated 24.02.2000 which was executed by Mrs. Dayavati, on 10.11.2014, the second suit i.e. the 2014 suit filed by Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Pras
