Strict adherence to procedural timelines is mandatory for judicial review applications; failure to file within the stipulated time without a valid reason results in dismissal.

Amarjeet Singh Serjit Singh J:

Introduction

[1] The matter was fixed before me for leave to commence judicial review proceedings under O 53 r 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 for an order of certiorari to quash the decision dated 31 May 2024 ("impugned decision") made by the Federal Territory Appeal Board against the applicant, the Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur ("DBKL").

[2] There was also a prayer for extension of time to abridge the time stipulated in O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012, in the event, this Court was of the view that the application was made out of time. If it came to that, DBKL pleaded that it had a good reason for the time to be extended under O 53 r 3(7) of the Rules of Court 2012.

[3] On 24 February 2025, I dismissed the application on the ground that there was no good reason given to extend the time. I did so, after considering the DBKL's affidavit in reply, which was filed out of time by 2 days, over the objections raised by the 2nd respondent. The fact that I considered whether there was a good reason meant that I had held that the application for leave was filed out of time.

[4] The reasons for my decision dismissing the application for leave are stated below.

Background

[5] DBKL is the local authority for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. The Federal Territory Appeal Board is constituted under the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982 ("FTP Act") to hear, consider, and make decisions on appeals against the decisions of the DBKL on development plans. The Federal Territory (Planning) (Appeal Board) Rules 1997 provides in r 10(i) that at the conclusion of the hearing or at another date, the Chairman of the Appeal Board shall deliver the decision of the Appeal Board and the Chairman shall state concisely the grounds for the decision.

[6] In the instant case, the 2nd respondent, LTK Development Sdn Bhd, had submitted development plans for approval by the DBKL. The development plans were on 9 January 2018 approved by a committee in DBKL established for that purpose. The approval was subject to certain conditions, including the plot ratio (the disputed condition). There was a requirement for a public hearing to be held according to r 5 of the Planning (Development) Rules 1970 in respect of the development project. Objections were raised at the public hearing. After considering the objections and the requirements of the Kuala Lumpur City Plan 2020 ("KLCP 2020"), DBKL, on 17 April 2019, made the decision to reduce the plot ratio to not exceeding 1:4.00.

[7] Dissatisfied with the disputed condition, the 2nd respondent, on 16 May 2019, appealed to the Federal Territory Appeals Board. DBKL was represented by its solicitors, Messrs Mazwan Pathma & Co, at the appeal. The Federal Territory Appeal Board delivered its decision on 31 May 2024, ie, the impugned decision. Messrs Mazwan Pathma & Co were present before the Federal Territory Appeal Board when the decision was delivered.

[8] Under s 45(12) of the FTP Act, the order of the Federal Territory Appeal Board is final and cannot be called into question in any Court. It is trite that such provision does not exclude judicial review, which is the only avenue left open to DBKL to challenge the impugned decision on administrative law grounds.

[9] The instant application for leave was filed on 26 September 2024. The application contained a prayer to extend time to file the application for leave out of time. The prayer to extend time was heard inter partes as required by O 53 r 3(8) of the Rules of Court 2012, which read as follows:

"An application to extend time must be served on all respondents and shall be heard inter partes".

[10] DBKL contended that time only runs from 10 July 2024, the date its solicitors communicated the impugned decision via email, and therefore the filing for leave was done within three months as stipulated in O 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012. It was further contended that, if this Court was of the view that time runs from 31 May 2024, the