A defendant may be charged with different offences arising from the same facts without invoking double jeopardy protections under CPC, as long as the charges involve different essential ingredients.

JUDGMENT

Collin Lawrance Sequerah J:

A) Introduction

[1] The Appellant abovenamed was charged in Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court on 28 November 2019 under s 409 of the Penal Code in Case No WA-62K-105-11/2019 ("CBT Case").

[2] On 8 July 2020, the Appellant was charged at Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court under s 4(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ("AMLA") in Case No WA-62K-104-07/2020 ("AMLA Case").

[3] The trial for the CBT Case and AMLA Case commenced on 27 July 2020 and continued on 5 August 2020, 7 August 2020 and 17 September 2020 respectively.

[4] On 6 January 2021, the Appellant was charged with 8 charges under s 132(2)(a) and s 132(2)(c) of the Companies Act 1965 in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court in case No WA-63-118-10/2020, WA-63-119-10/2020, WA-63-120-10/2020 and WA-63-121-10/2020 ("SSM Case").

[5] On 17 February 2021, the Learned Deputy Public Prosecutor in the SSM Case had applied for a discharge of the case.

[6] On 24 February 2021, the Learned Judge granted a discharge amounting to an acquittal in respect of all the charges in SSM Case after hearing submissions from the parties.

[7] The Appellant on 24 March 2021 filed an application to strike out the CBT Case and AMLA Case ("the Application") wherein inter alia, he prayed as follows:

"(a) pertuduhan dan pendakwaan terhadap Pemohon di bawah s 409 Kanun Keseksaan di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur Kes No WA-62K-105-11/2019 ("Kes CBT") diketepikan dan dibatalkan;

(b) pertuduhan dan pendakwaan terhadap Pemohon di bawah s 4(1)(b) Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram, Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan dan Hasil Daripada Aktiviti Haram 2001 ("AMLA") di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur Kes No WA-62K-104-07/2020 ("Kes AMLA") diketepikan dan dibatalkan."

[8] The said Application was heard on 26 April 2021 and was dismissed by the Learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") on 7 May 2021 ("the said Decision").

[9] The Appellant filed an appeal against the said Decision on 18 May 2021 ("the Appeal") which is now before this Court.

B) Parties Submissions

Appellant

[10] The gist of the Appellants argument in support of this appeal is that the SSM Case, the CBT Case and the AMLA Case arose from the same set of facts.

[11] It is contended, therefore, that s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code (" CPC ") applies, the result being that the Appellant is not be liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts.

[12] It was submitted that s 303 CPC has two limbs namely, where a person has been tried and convicted or acquitted, as the case may be, he is not be liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts.

[13] It was submitted that it is an undisputed fact that the SSM Case, the CBT Case and AMLA Case arose from the same set of facts.

[14] It was thus submitted that the Learned SCJ had erred in failing to consider the second limb, which is that the Appellant is not liable to be tried again on the same facts.

[15] The Appellant concluded by submitting that since the Appellant had been acquitted and discharged by a Court competent jurisdiction in the SSM Case, he should not be charged again on the same facts and where the evidence to be relied on by the Prosecution are essentially the same.

Respondent

[16] The Respondent submitted that the provision in s 173(g) CPC empowers a lower Court to discharge an accused with sufficient reasons at any stage of the case if it considers the charge to be groundless.

[17] The Respondent accordingly submitted that since the charges in question here were clear and drafted with sufficient precision to give notice to the accused of the charges against him, there was no flaw in the charge and no reasons set forth in the affidavit of the Appellant to that effect, the application to discharge the Appellant under s 173(g) CPC was without basis.

[18] The next point raised by the Respondent was that the lower Courts are not vested with inherent jurisdiction to order a discharge and acquittal with