Key Points: - The judgment discusses whether a consent order can be set aside by fresh action or by motion, and references exceptions (slip rule, clerical errors, or misstate of intent) (!) (!) . - It analyzes lack of consent as a potential ground to set aside a consent order and emphasizes that absence of consent typically requires a fresh action, with discussions of authority and representation during negotiations (!) (!) (!) . - It addresses the meaning and limits of "liberty to apply," stating it is for working out the judgment or seeking directions, not for unilateral variability of the consent order, and that manifest errors may be corrected under proper variation mechanisms rather than setting aside (!) (!) (!) (!) . - It clarifies that consent orders are binding contracts between the parties and can be varied or set aside only as permitted by law and proper procedure, with emphasis on fresh action for setting aside and not in the original action except for slip-rule corrections (!) (!) . - It notes that attempting to set aside a consent order due to misinterpretation or "global settlement" notions without proper basis is unsupported, reinforcing that alterations require appropriate process (!) (!) .

What is the proper mode to set aside a consent order: a fresh suit or an interlocutory application?

What are the grounds to set aside a consent order and how does lack of consent by a party affect its validity?

What is the effect and limits of "liberty to apply" in consent orders and can it be used to unilaterally vary terms?