Discretionary power of the court to permit cross-examinations hinges on good faith, timely applications, and justification for conflicting affidavit evidence.

Introduction

[1] This is a "peculiar" case wherein certain defendants have objected strenuously to the plaintiffs' application to cross-examine one of the defendants in respect of his affidavits filed in the originating summons (first cross-examination application). After I have allowed the first cross-examination application, the same defendants who objected to the first cross-examination application, filed their own application to cross-examine four deponents of affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiffs (second cross-examination application). The sole issue that arises is whether I should exercise my discretion to allow the second cross-examination application on, among others, the three following grounds:-

(a) is the second cross-examination application made in good faith?;

(b) are the applicants of the second cross-examination application estopped from filing the second cross-examination application based on their affidavits and conduct in opposing the first cross-examination application?; and/or

(c) is there unexplained and excessive delay in filing the second cross-examination application?

First Cross-Examination Application

[2] In this originating summons (OS), the plaintiffs (plaintiffs) have applied in court encl no 29 (court encl no 29) for leave of this court to cross-examine the first defendant (first defendant) on three affidavits affirmed by the first defendant.

[3] court encl no 29 has been "vigorously" opposed by the first defendant, second to fourth and sixth defendants (second, third, fourth and sixth defendants).

[4] On 15 May 2015, I allowed court encl no 29 (decision dated 15 May 2015). The grounds for the decision dated 15 May 2015 can be found in [2015] 1 LNS 755; [2015] AMEJ 1047 and [2015] MLRHU 479 (Charles Koo Ho Tung (No 1)).

Second Cross-Examination Application

[5] After the decision dated 15 May 2015, on 19 June 2015, the second to fourth and sixth defendants filed an application in court encl no 91 (court encl no 91). In court encl no 91, the second to fourth and sixth defendants applied for leave of this court to cross-examine the following deponents of affidavits:-

(a) the first plaintiff (first plaintiff) who affirmed six affidavits in this case;

(b) the third plaintiff (third plaintiff), the deponent of two affidavits filed in the OS;

(c) Ms Moy Sook Ching (Ms Moy) who affirmed four affidavits on behalf of the plaintiffs; and

(d) Mr Koo Ho Liang Henry (Mr Henry Koo) who has affirmed one affidavit in this case.

[6] In this judgment, I will refer to the first and third plaintiffs together with Ms Moy and Mr Henry Koo as the "four deponents".

Submission Of Second To Fourth And Sixth Defendants

[7] In support of court encl no 91, the second to fourth and sixth defendants have relied on my judgment in Charles Koo Ho Tung (No 1). According to learned counsel for the second to fourth and sixth defendants, all the relevant factors taken into account by this court in allowing court encl no 29, have been fulfilled in respect of court encl no 91. As such, the second to fourth and sixth defendants contended that the "same considerations warranting the cross-examination of (first defendant) ought to warrant the cross-examination" of the four deponents. The considerations which support court encl no 91, according to the second to fourth and sixth defendants are as follows:-

(a) court encl no 91 is not in respect of an interlocutory matter but applies for leave to cross-examine the four deponents so as to assist this court to decide the OS on its merits;

(b) there is no evidence that court encl no 91 is filed:-

(i) based on mala fide; or

(ii) for