The court clarifies the broad powers under the Industrial Relations Act regarding joinder, rejecting narrow interpretations limiting liability to employer-employee relationships.

[1] The appellant's appeal is against the decision of the learned High Court Judge who refused to quash the decision of the Industrial Court, which refused to allow the appellant to join the 3^rd to 5^th respondents in respect of a non-compliance proceeding related to an award obtained against the 2^nd respondent. We heard the appeal on 28 January 2015 and reserved judgment. My learned brothers Mohd Zawawi Salleh JCA and Idrus Harun JCA have read the judgment and approved the same. This is our judgment.

Preliminary

Jurisprudence Relating To Joinder Of Parties

[2] This judgment deals with the jurisprudence relating to joinder of parties in Industrial Court. The relevant sections which need to be considered under the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ( IRA 1967) are ss 29(a), (b), 32(1)(a) and 56(1), (2)(a)(i).

Section 29 (a), (b)

29. The Court may, in any proceedings before it:

(a) order that any party be joined, substituted or struck off;

(b) summon before it the parties to any such proceedings and any other person who in its opinion is connected with the proceedings.

Section 32 (1)(a) reads as follows:

32. (1) Any award made by the Court under this Act shall be binding on:

(a) all parties to the dispute or the reference to the Court under subsection 20(3) appearing or represented before the Court and all parties joined or substituted or summoned to appear or be represented before the Court as parties to the dispute or the reference to the Court under subsection 20(3).

Section 56 (1), (2)(a)(i) reads as follows:

56. (1) Any complaint that any term of any award or of any collective agreement which has been taken cognisance of by the Court has not been complied with may be lodged with the Court in writing by any trade union or person bound by such award or agreement.

(2) The Court may, upon receipt of the complaint:

(a) make an order directing any party:

(i) to comply with any term of the award or collective agreement.

[3] The general jurisprudence from the above sections as well as supportive case laws can be summarised as follows:

(i) IRA 1967 is a social legislation;

(ii) Third parties can be made liable to pay the award notwithstanding that they were not the employer;

(iii) Third parties cannot resist joinder or deny liability on the grounds there is no privity or is a separate legal entity, etc when there is sufficient nexus between the party to be joined and the party named in the reference;

(iv) The threshold test to be employed at the joinder stage appears to be whether the employee can demonstrate by way of prima facie evidence that the party who are requested to be joined have directly and/or indirectly and/or otherwise assumed liability or can be made liable partly or wholly for the payment of the award or for that matter purported award in cases where award has not been delivered. In essence, the threshold to satisfy the Industrial Court is low based on the above sections as well as supportive case laws in this area of jurisprudence. As long as the complaint of the employee is not frivolous, vexatious and/or abuse of process of Court, there should be no hindrance in permitting the joinder if nexus is shown.

(v) The issue of liability can only be dealt with after the joinder and hearing on merits. The parties to be joined should not at joinder stage be allowed to submit on the merits. Their presence at the joinder stage is only to verify the complaint of the employee to ensure that the facts relied on by the employee are credible.

[4] The learned counsel for the 3^rd respondent's submission in essence they are not the employer; and we quote:

"... it is highly undesir