Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The short question which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision is in relation to the construction of S. 18(3) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act ). This question arises in this way. An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonus arose between the appellant Hochtief Gammon and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela. This dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa by the Government of Orissa on the 14th November, 1960. After the reference was received by the Tribunal, it passed an order on the 17th November, 1960 that notice of the reference should be issued to the parties concerned. Purporting to give effect to this order, the office of the Tribunal issued notices not only to the appellant and the respondents, but also to the Deputy General Manager of M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. This was so done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government of Orissa containing the order of reference had been served on the said Dy. General Manager. After the notice issued by the Tribunal was received by the Dy. General Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., he appeared before the Tribunal and urged that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added as a party to the reference.

2. Meanwhile, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceeding pending before the Tribunal, and so, M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be joined as a party. In this application, the appellant alleged that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a necessary party, because the material documents which may have to be proved in the proceedings were with the said concern and, in fact, the enquiry in question would not be complete without the said concern being joined as a party. The Tribunal then considered the question of joining M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. as a party and held that it would decide the matter later. Meanwhile, the tribunal directed that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. which had appeared in response to the notice issued to it should remain present during the hearing of the reference on the merits.

3. This order did not satisfy the appellant, because it wanted a specific direction from the Tribunal to add M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. as a party to the reference. That is why the appellant moved the Orissa High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed that the order passed by the Tribunal refusing to deal with the matter should be set aside and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be joined as a party to the reference before it. This writ petition, however, failed, because the High Court took the view that it was premature. The High Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under S. 18(3) (b) of the Act, and so, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties, the High Court treated the application as incompetent because it was premature. Against this decision, the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and on his behalf, Mr. Chatterji has contended that the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings before it and that on the merits, M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary party. That is how the main question which arises for our decision is to determine the scope and effect of the provisions of S. 18(3) (b) of the Act.

4. In dealing with this question, it is necessary to consider the provisions of S. 18(b) in the Act as it was first enacted, and then consider the provisions of S. 18(3) (b) as they now stand. Under the original Act, Section 18 consisted of four clauses (a), (b), (c), and(d). We are concerned in the present appeal with clauses (a) and (b). Section 18(a) and (b) read t