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2025 MarsdenLR 2384

HIGH COURT MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR
YAP TECK CHOW & ANOR – Appellant
Versus
YAP TECK LOKE & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Suit No: 22NCvC-955-08-2012]



Petitioner Advocates:Sivaloganathan Yoganathan,Eric Clement,Pavithra Thirumalai ,Respondent Advocate: Choo Wai Hou,Lim Jing Jie,Ko Zen Zie

A judgment in default entered on an unliquidated claim is deemed a nullity and may be set aside without consideration of merits, emphasizing strict adherence to procedural requirements.

Headnote:(A) Rules of Court 2012 - Order 1A, Order 2, Order 42 r 13, Order 92 r 4 - Setting aside judgment in default - The judgment in default (JID) for RM4 million was set aside due to non-compliance with procedural rules, being entered for an unliquidated claim as liquidated. The discretion to cure irregularities can only be exercised in absence of prejudice, and here it was clear procedural irregularities existed. (Paras 11, 12, 13, 21)

(B) Legal Principles - The principle that a judgment entered irregularly may be set aside without reference to merits is established, emphasizing procedural fairness and the necessity of adherence to statutory provisions. (Paras 12, 20)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiffs and the first defendant are cousins with the defendant seeking to set aside the JID entered in default for failing to appear, alleging it was defectively obtained. (Paras 5, 6)

Findings of Court:
The JID was irregular as it involved unliquidated damages improperly classified as liquidated amounts, thus setting aside the judgment was warranted. (Paras 12, 21, 32)

Issues: Whether the JID was validly entered and the implications of not meeting procedural requirements. (Paras 8, 10, 11)

Ratio Decidendi: The court established that a judgment in default for a non-compliant claim type is a nullity and therefore can be set aside; procedural adherence is paramount, and estoppel cannot be asserted against statutory provisions. (Paras 22, 29, 30)

Result: JID set aside with no order as to costs, and the defendant is given time to appear and file a defense.

Table of Content
1. extension of time to set aside judgment. (Para 1 , 2 , 4)
2. background facts of the dispute. (Para 5 , 6 , 10)
3. nature of 1st defendant's application. (Para 8 , 9)
4. principles on setting aside irregular judgments. (Para 12 , 14 , 16)
5. legal principles on liquidated and unliquidated damages. (Para 19 , 20 , 21)
6. estoppel and unconscionable conduct considerations. (Para 24 , 27 , 28)
7. power of the court to set aside judgments. (Para 30)
8. court's conclusion and order. (Para 31)
Su Tiang Joo J:

Introduction

[1] The 1st defendant applied (Encl 39) pursuant to O 1A, O 2 rr 1, 3 and 5 and the inherent powers of the Court under O 92 r 4 Rules of Court 2012 (" ROC 2012") for an extension of time to apply to set aside a judgment dated 31 May 2013 entered in default ("JID") of him making an appearance (Encl 34).

[2] The JID was entered for a sum of RM4 million with interest thereon at 4% p.a. from an indeterminate date and costs on a solicitor-client basis grounded on the tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.

[3] Having found that the pith and substance of the application was to set aside the JID, I had on 24 January 2025 set aside the JID with no order as to costs with the 1st defendant given 14 days to enter appearance and to file his defence within 14 days thereafter with the parties to attend before the learned Senior Assistant Registrar on 25 February 2025 to take further directions.

[4] Dissatisfied, both the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs have each appealed (Encls 66 and 67), and these are the grounds of judgment for both the appeals in short form.

Background Facts

[5] The plaintiffs and the 1st defendant are cousins, where their respective fathers are brothers.

[6] The application (Encl 39) sought that the time prescribed under O 42 r 13 ROC be extended to 30 days from the date the Court allows such an application, to set aside the JID.

[7] As will be discussed in detail below, the application (Encl 39) has a prayer for such further or other relief as deemed fit by this Honourable Court.

Pith And Substance Of Enclosure 39

[8] The plaintiffs pointed out that the 1st defendant's application was merely to extend time to challenge the JID. Thus, the 1st plaintiff asserted that the 1st defendant was not challenging that the JID was regularly obtained.

[9] However, I observed that from the affidavit (Encl 40) filed in support of Encl 39, the 1st defendant had asserted (Encl 40 para 16.4) that the plaintiffs' claim in the Writ (Encl 1) and Statement of Claim (Encl 2) is defective as it claimed for liquidated or quantified amounts for:

(a) general damages of RM1 million;

(b) aggravated damages of RM1 million;

(c) punitive damages of RM1 million;

(d) exemplary damages of RM1 million;

(e) interest on the damages at 4% p.a. from the date therein but which is not set out; and

(f) costs to be paid on a solicitor client basis,

for a claim in tort grounded on conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.

[10] With no appearance having been entered by the 1st defendant and the 3rd defendant, the plaintiffs applied (Encl 31) for judgment in default of appearance to be entered in their favour for the claims set out in their Statement of Claim (supra). This was allowed by the former learned Judge on 31 May 2013 (Encl 34). Therefore, the plaintiffs were armed with such a JID for RM4 million with interest thereon and costs on a solicitor-client basis. The 1st defendant asserts this JID is defective and oppressive (Encl 40 para 24).

[11] Thus, the pith and substance of the application (Encl 39) is to have the JID set aside.

Law On Setting Aside JID

[12] Although the plaintiffs have cited several Court of Appeal authorities, with respect, I find the following three Federal Court authorities to be instructive and binding on this Court. They are:

(i) Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad ; [1996] 1 CLJ 241 ; [1996] 1 AMR 215 ; and (ii) Maxland Sdn Bhd v. Timatch Sdn Bhd ; ; [2014] 4 AMR 645 , paras 21 to 25. In fact, in Maxland

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