A single letter does not constitute actionable harassment or intimidation under tort law, as it cannot establish a persistent course of conduct or unlawful threats.

Introduction

Professional Correspondence Gone Awry

[1] This judgment addresses one of the peculiar disputes to come before this court recently. This case strikes at the very heart of professional legal practice and asks fundamental questions about the boundaries between legitimate legal correspondence and actionable harassment.

[2] In this case, the remarkable spectacle of a senior advocate with thirty years of experience alleging harassment and intimidation from a single professional letter-a letter that, by any objective standard, seems to be routine solicitor-to-solicitor correspondence.

[3] For avoidance of confusion, the plaintiff in this case is referred to as Dhanaraj while the defendants are referred to as D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6 and D7 respectively.

The Catalyst Of The Single Letter

[4] The origin of this action stems from professional correspondence concerning a single letter dated 5 November 2024. This letter, with the seemingly harmless title "Notice of (potential) action for conduct interfering with the due administration of justice," sought clarification about statements Dhanaraj allegedly made during a court of Appeal hearing on 9 October 2024.

[5] The letter's requests were seemingly straightforward, namely for copies of correspondence regarding a USD4 million withdrawal from court. The details of meetings with the judicial officer and the particulars of alleged communications with the CJM (assumedly the Chief Justice of Malaya).

[6] Yet this routine professional inquiry would trigger a legal avalanche that would ultimately consume far more in legal costs than the clarifications it sought could ever have been worth.

[7] This harassment claim cannot be considered in isolation - it arises from the contentious background of Suit 514, a USD 5.25 million commercial dispute where the current plaintiff and defendants are on opposite sides. Dhanaraj acts for the defendants in that Suit 514, while all seven defendants in this case represent the plaintiff.

[8] The defendants' response was swift and unwavering. Instead of addressing the substance of Dhanaraj's claims, all defendants filed applications to strike out the statement of claim dated 19 November 2024 in two separate proceedings. Five of the seven defendants (D2, D3, D4, D5, and D7) submitted their striking out applications via encl 21. D1 and D6 applied the same through encl 19, both under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of court 2012 (ROC 2012). All defendants directly challenged the very legal basis of Dhanaraj's case, arguing that his action had no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous and vexatious, and amounted to an abuse of the court's process.

[9] This judgment is in respect of encl 21 striking out application made by D2, D3, D4, D5 and D7 only. The basis of the striking out is based on the non-existence of the tort of harassment and tort of intimidation. Since there is no such tort that took place vide the letter, the defendants in encl 21 contend that this action is an abuse of process and should be struck out.

[10] The defendants in encl 21 argue that a single letter, regardless of how unwelcome, can never constitute actionable harassment. The Federal court's precedent in Mohd Ridzwan Abdul Razak v. Asmah Hj Mohd Nor 2016 MarsdenLR 145 ; ; ; [2016] 4 AMR 256 FC requires a "persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct"—a standard that a single communication cannot meet.

[11] On the tort of intimidation, the defendants in encl 21 contend that how could a