1. Disqualification of a Legislative Assembly member under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution and Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Allegation of bias against Chief Election Commissioner. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
1996 Supreme(SC) 845
1996(3) Supreme 679
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.I., N.P. Singh & B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
Election Commission of India & Ors. ---Appellants
versus
Dr. Subramanian Swamy & Ors. ---Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 504 (NC) of 1994
Decided on 23-4-1996
Important Points
For reason of possible bias, apart from the legal aspect, even prudence demands that the Chief Election Commissioner should recuse himself from expressing any opinion on the issue of disqualification of Ms.J. Jayalalitha on the grounds alleged by Dr. Swamy and if the two Election Commissioners do not reach a unanimous decision on the issue, it would be necessary for the Chief Election Commissioner to express his opinion on the doctrine of necessity.
Subject
Constitutional Law - Election Law
Act Referred
Headnote
Held : that Under Article 192 if any question arises in regard to disqualification referred to in Article 191(1), the question has to referred to the Election Commission for its opinion and the Governor has to give his decision in accordance with that opinion. Article 324(2) provides for the constitution of Election Commission; if it is a single member body it will comprise of the Chief Election Commissioner only, if it is a multi-member body he will be joined by the other Election Commissioner(s). In the case of a single-member body, if the Governor seeks his opinion, he perhaps can invoke the doctrine of necessity but that question which arose before the learned Single Judge is no more germane because during the pendency of the appeal two more Election Commissioners were appointed making it a multi-member body. (Para 12)
Further held: If the Chief Election Commissioner, for reason of possible bias, is disqualified from expressing an opinion, now should the Election Commission conduct itself ? As pointed out earlier Shri Sanghi, the learned counsel for the appellant, has very frankly and with his usual fairness stated that the Chief Election Commissioner preferred this appeal only because he genuinely believed that the scheme of Article 324 did not conceive of a decision by majority, but if the Court comes to the conclusion that a decision can be reached without the Chief Election Commissioner participating in decision making in the special circumstances of the case, the latter is not at all keen or anxious to hear and adjudicate upon the matter at issue before the Election Commission. We are quite conscious of the high office the Chief Election Commissioner occupies. Ordinarily we would be loath to uphold the submission of bias but having regard to the wide ramification the opinion of the Election Commissioner would have on the future of Ms.J.Jayalalitha, we think that the opinion, whatever it be, should not be vulnerable. The participation of the Chief Election Commissioner in the backdrop of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court would certainly permit an argument of prejudice, should the opinion be adverse to Ms. J. Jayalalitha. Therefore, apart from the legal aspect, even prudence-demands that the Chief Election Commissioner should recuse himself from expressing any opinion in the matter. However, the situation is not so simple, it is indeed complex, in that, what would happen if the two Election Commissioners do not agree and there is a conflict of opinion between them? That would lead to a stalemate situation and the Governor would find it difficult to take a decision based on any such opinion. In such a situation, can the doctrine of necessity be invoked in favour of the Chief Election Commissioner? (Para 13)
Consequently held that the proper course to follow is that the Chief Election Commissioner should call a meeting of the Election Commission to adjudicate on the issue of disqualification of Ms. J. Jayalalitha on the grounds alleged by Dr. Swamy. After calling the meeting he should act as the Chairman but then he may recuse himself by announcing that he would not participate in the formation of opinion. If the two Election Commissioners reach a unanimous opinion, the Chief Election Commissioner will have the opinion, communicated to the Governor. If the two Election Commissioners do not reach a unanimous decision in the matter of expressing their opinion on the issue referred to the Election Commission, it would be necessary for the Chief Electron Commissioner to express his opinion on the doctrine of necessity. We think that in the special circumstances of this case this course of action would be the most appropriate one to follow because if the two Election Commissioners do not agree, we have no doubt that the doctrine of necessity would compel the Chief Election Commissioner to express his views so that the majority opinion could be communicated to the Governor to enable him to take a decision in accordance therewith as required by Article 192(1) of the Constitution. (Para 15)
Judicial Decisions-Doctrine of Necessity-Applicability.
Held : It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such cases the. doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach a unanimous decisions, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked. (Para 14)
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the Chief Election Commissioner must participate in decision-making despite reasonable apprehension of bias — Applicability of the doctrine of necessity in a multi-member Election Commission. (Para 7 , 8 )
3. The Governor is bound by the Election Commission's opinion — A multi-member Commission can decide by majority — Reasonable apprehension of bias justifies recusal of the Chief Election Commissioner. (Para 6 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 )
4. In a multi-member Election Commission, a biased member may recuse himself unless a stalemate occurs, in which case the doctrine of necessity permits his participation. (Para 14 , 15 )
5. Chief Election Commissioner to recuse himself unless the other Election Commissioners fail to reach a unanimous decision, in which case he shall participate under the doctrine of necessity. (Para 15 , 16 )
6. Is the Governor bound by the opinion of the Election Commission regarding the disqualification of a member of the House of the Legislature?
Yes, under Article 192(2) of the Constitution, the Governor is obligated to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and must act according to that opinion, making the Commission's opinion decisive. (Para 6 )
7. Must the Election Commission act unanimously in its decision-making process?
No, the Election Commission can transact business by majority decision. The act of a majority is regarded as the act of the whole body, and such a mechanism is consistent with Article 324. (Para 12 )
8. Can the Chief Election Commissioner be recused from decision-making due to a reasonable apprehension of bias?
Yes, if a reasonable apprehension of bias is established, the Chief Election Commissioner should recuse himself to ensure the decision is not vulnerable and justice appears to be done, provided an alternative forum exists. (Para 9 , 13 )
9. When is the doctrine of necessity invoked in the context of judicial or quasi-judicial bias?
The doctrine of necessity is invoked when there is no other authority to decide an issue, making it imperative for the authority to act despite considerations of judicial propriety to avoid stifling the action. (Para 14 )
10. How does the doctrine of necessity apply if a multi-member Election Commission reaches a stalemate after a member's recusal?
If the remaining members cannot reach a unanimous decision, the recused member must participate under the doctrine of necessity to ensure a majority opinion is formed and communicated to the Governor. (Para 15 )
JUDGMENT
Ahmadi, CJI .-This is an appeal preferred by the Election Commission of India and Shri T.N. Seshan, the Chief Election Commissioner, (when the former was a single-member commission) against the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras dated 15.11.1993 by which, reversing the view taken by the learned single Judge of the High Court dated 2.7.1993, it held that in view of the promulgation of Ordinance (Ordinance No. 32 of 1993) the doctrine of necessity was no more attracted and applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The question raised in this appeal arises in the backdrop of the following facts :
2. Ms. J. Jayalalitha was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu on the AIADMK ticket in the General Sections held in June 1991 and on being elected as the leader of the party she was sworn-in as the Chief Minister of the State. On 2.10.1992, Dr. Subramanian Swamy preferred a petition to the Governor under Article 192 of the Constitution of India alleging that the Chief Minister had incurred a disqualification of being a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State, in that, she being a partner in the partnership firm run in the name and style of Messrs Jaya Publications had entered into a contract with State Government and which contract was subsisting on the date of the petition, in view of sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Article 191 of the Constitution read with section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the R.P. Act ). It would be advantageous to reproduce the said two provisions at this stage.
"191(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State-
(a) ...........
(b) ...........
(c) ...........
(d) ...........
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.
Explanation-For the purposes of this clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule by reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or such State.
9A. Disqualification of Government contracts, etc. - A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by that Government.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part.
Since the Governor did not forward the petition to the Election Commission, Dr.Swamy moved a Writ Petition No.942 of 1992 against the Governor for a direction that he forthwith forward the same to the Election Commission as required by Article 192(2) of the Constitution for its opinion. While the said writ petition was pending in the High Court, the Governor forwarded the petition to the Election Commission on 27.3.1993 for its opinion. Thereupon Mr.J.Jayalitha moved two Writ Petitions Nos. 6094 and 6095 of 1993, the first for a writ of prohibition against Shri Seshan not to deal with the petition forwarded to him by the Governor as she had a reasonable apprehension that he was biased in favour of Dr.Swamy and the second for a declaration that she had not incurred the disqualification as alleged by Dr.Swamy.
3. Both these writ petitions came up for disposal before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. He allowed the first writ petition holding that the evidence placed on record clearly established that Ms.J.Jayalalitha s apprehension that Shri Seshan may not be able to take an impartial view because of his strong bias in favour of Dr.Swamy could not be said to be misplaced or unreas