IMPORTANT POINT
Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act prescribes three months period of limitation to be reckoned from the date of the award by Court disposing of reference u/s 18 of the Act and not the appellate Court dealing with appeal against award of reference Court.

JUDGMENT

A.M. Ahmadi, CJI. - Special leave granted.

2. The question which arises for determination in these two appeals is whether the period of three months prescribed for making an application for redetermination of the amount of compensation under Section 28-A of the and Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the act ) begins to run against the applicant from the date of the Award under Section 18 of the Act or even from the date of the decision of the appeal, if any, preferred against the Award. In order to appreciate the point raised, we may at once read Section 28-A insofar as it is relevant:

"28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded."

The factual matrix in which the question has to be answered may now be briefly noticed. By a notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, dated 3rd October, 1969, and gazetted on the same day, a certain parcel of land at Cavelossim village, Salcete Taluka in the State of Goa was proposed to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for construction of an air-to-ground range for the Indian Navy. The possession of the land was taken by the Government on 2nd April, 1970. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made and published in the gazette on 10th June, 1971. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation for the acquired lands at rates ranging from Rs. 0.75 to Rs. 2.50 per sq.m. for different plots comprising the land under acquisition. This award was made on 2nd August, 1972. A reference was sought and made to the learned District Judge, LAC No. 420 of 1981, which was disposed of on 24th June, 1985 whereby the rate for determination of compensation was revised to Rs. 5 per sq.m. However, in another award made in LAC No. 406 of 1981 on 14th October, 1985, compensation was allowed for a different plot at Rs. 9 per sq. m. In yet another award, in LAC No. 417 of 1981, made on the same day, compensation was awarded for another plot at the rate of Rs. 10 per sq. m. In appeal, the High Court, by its judgment dated 24th February, 1987, reduced the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq. m. Thereafter, the appellant in Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P. No. 24435 of 1995, applied, on 13th May, 1987, under Section 28-A of the Act, for redetermination of compensation for his plot of land. So also, the appellant in Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P. No. 24584 of 1995 made a similar application under Section 28-A of the Act on 28th April, 1987. Both these applications were dismissed by the Deputy Collector on 3rd September, 1988 as time-barred, having been preferred after the expiry of the period of three months prescribed by the statute. Feeling aggrieved, both the appellants questioned the decision by filing separate writ petitions on 11th February, 1989. The High Court of Bombay, Goa Bench, by its judgment dated 5th July, 1995 dismissed both the writ petitions upholding the view that the applications under Section 28-A were time-barred. Hence these appeals by special leave.

3. Before examining the decisions of this Court on which the