IMPORTANT POINT
The master plan prepared as per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land is vacant land or not and to that extent Atia Begum 1993(2) SCC 546 is not correctly decided.

Headnote:Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976-Explanation (c) to Section 2(o), Explanation to Section 6(1), 2(h), 7, 15 and 16-Whether for purposes of quantification of vacant land, the master plan as in existence on enforcement of the Act, viz, 17.2.1976, would be applicable or the master plan prepared subsequent thereto could be taken note of for quantifying the vacant land (the later)-Effect-To that extent Atia Begum s case 1993(3) SCC 546 is overruled-Consequences of filing statement under wrong impression that vacant land held by a person is in excess of ceiling limit left open-3 appeals allowed and two are dismissed-Order accordingly.
       Held : The question for determination in these appeals is whether it is the master plan that was in existence when the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulations) Act, 1976 (for short, the Act ) was enforced, and not the plan prepared subsequently, that has to be taken into consideration to determine if land is vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit fixed under the Act. (Para 1)
       The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, relying upon the decision of a Bench of two Judges in Atia Mohammadi Begum (Smt.) v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1993) 2 SCC 546], has held that when the land was not vacant land on the date of the commencement of the Act, the authorities cannot convert that land into vacant land by their unilateral act by including it in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture. On this view, the proceedings taken under the Act have been declared null and void by the High Court. Since reconsideration of the decision in Atia Begum s case was sought, it was directed by a Bench of Two Judges that these matters be placed before a three judges Bench. Therefore, these appeals have been placed before us. (Paras 2 & 3)
       Now we will briefly notice the facts of Atia Begum s case and the question involved therein. In that case the question was regarding the quantification of vacant land. The competent authority had declared that the appellant had 19813.83 sq. mts. of vacant land in Aligarh in excess of the ceiling limit but the District Judge reduced the area of the excess land to 6738.23 sq. mts. The order of the District Judge was challenged by both, i.e., the owner and the State by filing writ petitions in the High Court. The owner s writ petition was dismissed and that of the State was partly allowed. In appeal before this Court, the owner sought restoration of the order of the District Judge which had been set aside by the High Court on the interpretation of the provisions of the Act. The Act came into force in the State of Uttar Pradesh on 17th February, 1976. At that time, there was no master plan for the area of Aligarh. The master plan for Aligarh was made on 24th February, 1980. In that master plan, the land in dispute was shown. The High Court took the view that by virtue of explanation (e) of Section 2(o) defining urban land , the land of the appellant could not be treated as mainly used for the purpose of agriculture because it was shown in the master plan made on 24th February, 1980. The correctness of this view was in issue in Atia Begum s case. The decision, though it notices that determination of the area of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit under the Act is to be made with reference to the date of commencement of the Act, fails to notice the explanation to Section 6 which provides the meaning of the expression commencement of this Act . (Para 8)
       If the expression "commencement of the Act" is read with reference to the aforesaid explanation, the area of doubt about the correctness of the decision of Atia Begum s case becomes very narrow, e.g., few observations therein which are these:
       "Just as the holder of the land cannot by his subsequent actions reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action increase the area of the excess vacant land by a similar action."
       The observations that the authorities by their subsequent action after 17th February, 1976 cannot alter or introduce the master plan which has the effect of increasing the area of excess vacant land do not represent the correct view of law. The aforesaid explanation to Section 6(1), inter alia, provides that where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes vacant land would be the date of the commencement of the Act as regards such land. Development and town planning are ongoing processes and they go on changing from time to time depending upon the local needs. That apart, the definition of the "master plan" in Section 2(h) is very significant. It reads as under:
       "2 (h) master plan , in relation to an area within an urban agglomeration or any part thereof, means the plan (by whatever name called) prepared under any law for the time being in force or in pursuance of an order made by the State Government for the development of such area or part thereof and providing for the stages by which such development shall be carried out."
       The above provision, inter alia, contemplates the master plan prepared under any law for the time being in force for development of an area. The plan shall also provide for the stages by which such development shall be carried out. It is evident from the aforesaid definition of master plan that it takes in view any plan prepared even subsequent to the coming into force of the Act. Further, the explanation to Section 6 (1), as noticed above, very significantly provides that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act shall file a statement before the competent authority and "the commencement of the Act" under clause (2) would be when the land becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, the date of commencement of the Act in a case where the land, which was not vacant earlier, would be the date on which such land becomes vacant land. It, thus, contemplates a situation of land, not being vacant, becoming vacant due to preparation of a master plan subsequent to 17th February, 1976. Further, the provisions of the Act require filing of a statement under Sections 6,7,15 and 16 from time to time as and when land acquires the character of a vacant land. Obligation to file statement under the Act arises when a person comes to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, which date necessarily may not be 17th February, 1976. It would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, we hold that the master plan prepared as per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Act is to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land is vacant land or not and, to this extent, Atia Begum is not correctly decided. (Paras 9 to 12)
       Held however, in these matters, however, we are not concerned with the question as to the consequences of filing of a statement by a person under a wrong impression that the vacant land held by him is in excess of ceiling limit if it was not so when he filed a statement. This aspect is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. (Para 13)
       Held consequently : For the aforesaid reasons, C.A.Nos. 3813/1996, 7238/2001 and 7239/2001 are allowed and C.A.Nos. 1149/1985 and 10851/1996 are dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.-The question for determination in these appeals is whether it is the master plan that was in existence when the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulations) Act, 1976 (for short, the Act ) was enforced, and not the plan prepared subsequently, that has to be taken into consideration to determine if land is vacant land held in excess of the ceiling limit fixed under the Act.

2. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, relying upon the decision of a Bench of two Judges in Atia Mohammadi Begum (Smt.) v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1993) 2 SCC 546], has held that when the land was not vacant land on the date of the commencement of the Act, the authorities cannot convert that land into vacant land by their unilateral act by including it in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture. On this view, the proceedings taken under the Act have been declared null and void by the High Court.

3. Since reconsideration of the decision in Atia Begum s case was sought, it was directed by a Bench of Two Judges that these matters be placed before a three Judges Bench. Therefore, these appeals have been placed before us.

4. Atia Begum s case also came to be considered in Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P. Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel & Ors. [(2001) 5 SCC 101] before a three Judges Bench of which two of us (Bharucha, CJ and Sabharwal, J.) were members. Since, in the said case, the matter was not concerning quantification of excess vacant land, the question whether, or purpose of quantification of vacant land, the master plan as in existence on enforcement of the Act, namely, 17th February, 1976, would be applicable or the master plan prepared subsequent thereto could be taken note of for quantifying the vacant land was not examined and was left open to be decided in an appropriate case. In Shantidevi Gaikwad s case it was, however, observed that Atia Begum s case did not hold that planning and development, which is a State subject, would stand frozen on 17th February, 1976 and that the said decision cannot be read as laying down the law that for all and every purpose, the master plan as in existence on 17th February, 1976 will freeze and also that the definition of master plan does not contemplate a static master plan . On the facts of Shantidevi Gaikwad s case, it was concluded that the High Court, erroneously relying on Atia Begum s case, held that the user as provided in the master plan as in existence on 17th February, 1976 alone is to be seen and the subsequent change in the master plan reserving the land for open space is of no consequence. The view of the competent authority that the land would permanently remain in the residential zone was held to be erroneous.

5. The primary object of the Act was to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to sub-serve the common good. Section 1 refers to the short title, application and commencement of the Act. It applies in the first instance to the whole of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and to all the Union Territories and it shall also apply to such other State which adopts this Act. Thus, in these States including Andhra Pradesh from which many of these appeals arise, the Act came into force on 17th February, 1976. Section 2 deals with definitions. Section 2(c) defines ceiling limit as the ceiling limit specified in Section 4. Section 2(n) defines urban agglomeration as under:

"2(n) urban agglomeration ,-

(A) in relation to any State or Union territory specified in Col. (1) of Schedule

I, means,-

(i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corresponding entry in Col. (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area specified in the corresponding entry in Col. (3) thereof; and

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2001 Supreme(SC) 1550

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