IMPORTANT POINT
True distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in nature or quality of the act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society.

Headnote:Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986-Section 3(2)-Preventive detention order-High Court set aside the order holding that there was nothing to show acts attributed to detenue were affecting maintenance of public order-Appeal-Purpose and intent of preventive detention-Law has to be justified by striking right balance between individual liberty on one hand and needs of an orderly society on other-Distinction between areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of reach of act in question on society-Test to determine-True test is not the kind but potentiality of act in question-Order of detention showed detenu was history sheeter against whom 3 cases were instituted and two specific instances indicated the gravity of his acts-Court could not substitute its own opinions for that of detaining authority when grounds of detention were precise, prominent and proximate-Detention order had specific purpose to serve-Impugned judgment was liable to be set aside and detenu to surrender to custody.
       Held : The distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order . The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed"? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. (Para 7)
       The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. (Para 11)
       The Court cannot substitute its own opinions for that of the detaining authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant. That is the case here. There is no vagueness or staleness. The incidents have been highlighted in the grounds of detention coupled with the definite indication as to the impact thereof which have been precisely stated in paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention quoted above. The two incidents referred to show as to in what manner the detenu was demanding money from whatsoever was purchasing land and giving threats to kill if the demands were not met. The incidents clearly substantiate the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority as to how the acts of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court. Learned counsel for the detenu submitted that even if it is so the judgment of the High Court should not be set aside and the matter could be remitted back to it for fresh decision. We find no substance in such a plea. The order of detention has a specific purpose to serve. That being so, we set aside the judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall forthwith surrender to custody to serve the remainder period of sentence. (Para 14)

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.

2. The State of Andhra Pradesh calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashing the order of detention dated 15.7.2003 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City (in short the Commissioner ) directing detention of Chinnaboina Shankar @ C. Shankar (hereinafter referred to as the detenu ). The order of detention was passed in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short the Act ). Wife of the detenu Smt. C. Anita filed a habeas corpus writ application before the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning legality of the order of detention. The primary stand taken in the writ petition was that the alleged acts as highlighted in the grounds of detention by no stretch of imagination can be called to affect public tranquility and/or be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was submitted that the incidents to which reference was made in the grounds of detention allegedly took place long back and there was no live link to warrant the order of detention. The High Court held that though there was proximity with the incidents highlighted in the order of detention there was nothing to show that those acts were affecting maintenance of public order. It was further held that even if the detenu was held to be a goonda and land grabber that was not sufficient to warrant preventive detention. Accordingly the order of detention was quashed.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court s approach is clearly erroneous. The grounds of detention not only referred to the two specific instances but also clearly indicated as to how nearly 30 cases were instituted against the detenu and the adverse effect of his activities which created a sense of terror affecting public tranquility. Reference was made to paragraph 3 of the order of detention which according to learned counsel was sufficient to show as to in what manner the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

4. In response, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that at the most the allegations made affect some individuals but there was no public order involved. The alleged incidents referred to in the grounds of detention took place long before the issuance of order of detention and, therefore, the High Court was justified in quashing the order of detention.

5. Before dealing with rival submissions, it would be appropriate to deal with the purpose and intent of preventive detention. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence, while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the concerned law. The action of Executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner, the failure to conform to which should lead to detention. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance, with great latitude in the exercise of its discretion. The Detaining Authority may act on any material and on any information that it may have before it. Such material and information may merely afford basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion to take action, but may not satisfy the tests of legal proof on which alone a conviction for offence will be tenable. Th

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2004 Supreme(SC) 923

IMPORTANT POINTTrue distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in nature or quality of the act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society.

Cases Referred (13)

IMPORTANT POINT
True distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in nature or quality of the act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society.