2004 Supreme(SC) 1522

2004(8) Supreme 678
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi)
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
State of Jharkhand & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Govind Singh -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1405 of 2004
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 343 of 2004)
Decided on 3-12-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Gopal Prasad, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Under the provisions of Sections 52 and 68 of Indian Forest Act (as amended by Bihar Act) vehicle as liable for confiscation may be released on payment of value of vehicle and not otherwise.

Headnote:(i) Interpretation of Statute-Intention of Legislature is primarily to be gathered from language used-Construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided-A casus omissus cannot be supplied by Court except in the case of clear necessity.

       Held : Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (Para 17)

       Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". (Para 21)

       (ii) Indian Forest Act, 1927-Section 52(3) (as amended by Bihar Act 9 of 1990)-Vehicle seized for alleged involvement in commission of forest offence-High Court in writ jurisdiction ordered for its release on payment of fine in lieu of confiscation even though there was no provision in the Act-Provisions of Sections 52 and 68 showed that vehicle as liable for confiscation could be released on payment of value of vehicle and not otherwise-Impugned judgment deserved to be set aside.

       Held : Therefore, on a combined reading of Section 52 and Section 68 of the Act as amended by the Bihar Act, the vehicle as liable for confiscation may be released on payment of the value of the vehicle and not otherwise. This is certainly a discretionary power, exercise of which would depend upon by gravity of the offence. The officer is empowered to release the vehicle on the payment of the value thereof as compensation. This discretion has to be judicially exercised. Section 68 of the Act deals with power to compound offences. It goes without saying that when the discretionary power is conferred, the same has to be exercised in a judicial manner after recording of reasons by the concerned officer as to why the compounding was necessary to be done. In the instant case, learned Single Judge did not refer to the power available under Section 68 of the Act and on the contrary, introduced the concept of reading into Section 52 of the Act, a power to levy fine in lieu of confiscation which is impermissible. In the impugned judgment nowhere the value of the truck which was liable for confiscation was indicated. It appears that the first appellate Court and the revisional authority did not consider it to be a fit case where the vehicle was to be released and were of the considered view that confiscation was warranted. They took specific note of the fact that fake and fabricated documents were produced to justify possession of the seized articles. In any event the respondent had not made any prayer for compounding in terms of Section 68 of the Act. Confiscation in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the Act is the immediate statutory action which provides that when forest offence as defined in Section 2(3) of the Act is believed to have been committed in respect of the seized vehicle, the authorized officer may confiscate the forest produce and the vehicle involved in the transportation of the forest produce. Foundation for action in terms of Section 52(3) of the Act is the belief entertained by the concerned officer that forest offence has been committed. It is not the value of the forest produce which is relevant, but the value of the article liable for confiscation. In the instant case it is the truck carrying the forest produce. (Paras 25 and 26)