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1963 Supreme(SC) 36

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
11th February, 1963
S.K DAS, A.K SARKAR AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.
State of Punjab, Appellant
Versus
Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
M/s. R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates for Appellant; Mr. S. P. Sinha Senior Advocate (Mr. Shaukat Hussain Advocate with him), for Respondent No. 2.
Civil Revn. No. 268 of 1958, D/- 16-11-1959-Punj.

Advocates:
R.Ganapathy Iyer, R.N.SACH, S.P.SINHA, SHAUKAT HUSSAIN

The limitation period for filing an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, runs from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the essential contents of the award, ensuring fair play and natural justice.

Headnote:(A) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 18 - Proviso - Limitation for application for reference - Knowledge of award - Literal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of Collector's award" not appropriate - Knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice - The expression must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him actually or constructively - Knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. (Para 5)

(B) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 18 - Jurisdiction of civil court - Whether a civil court to which a reference is made can reject the reference on the ground that the application was filed beyond the prescribed time - Conflict of judicial opinion exists on whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is confined to the objections raised in the application or extends to the question of limitation - Question held to be academic in the present case. (Para 6)

Facts of the case:
Land was acquired by the state for use as a firing and bombing range. The owners were not notified about the acquisition and were not present at the time of the award. After the award was made, the owners applied for interim payment of compensation. Upon receiving the compensation amount, they filed an application for a reference under Section 18 of the Act, claiming the market value of the land was higher than the amount fixed in the award. The subordinate judge discharged the reference as being barred by time, but the High Court set aside this order, holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the owners did not have knowledge of the essential contents of the award when they applied for interim payment. The date of knowledge was determined to be the date on which the compensation was paid. Since the application for reference was made within six months from the date of payment, it was not barred by time.

Issues: Whether the application for reference was filed within the limitation period prescribed by the proviso to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether the civil court has the jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation on such a reference.

Ratio Decidendi: The period of limitation for a reference under Section 18 runs from the date the affected party acquires actual or constructive knowledge of the essential contents of the award. A literal interpretation of the statutory period from the date of the award would be unjust where no notice was provided, as fair play requires the party to be aware of the award's contents before the limitation clock begins.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • administrative law
    • land acquisition
      • compensation
        • limitation (Para 5)
      • reference (Para 1, 3, 6)
  • practice and procedure
    • jurisdiction (Para 1, 3, 6)
    • limitation (Para 3, 4, 5)

Table of Contents

1. Land acquisition — Application for reference under Section 18, Land Acquisition Act — Dispute over limitation period and date of knowledge of the award. (Para 2 )

2. Whether the application for reference was barred by limitation and whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation. (Para 1 , 3 )

3. Knowledge of the award for limitation purposes requires knowledge of its essential contents, not merely the fact that an award was made. (Para 5 , 6 )

4. The six-month limitation period under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act runs from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the award's essential contents. (Para 5 )

5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 7 )

6. When does the limitation period for a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act begin if the party was not notified?

The period of six months runs from the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by them, either actually or constructively, as a requirement of fair play and natural justice. (Para 5 )

7. What constitutes knowledge of an award for the purpose of calculating limitation under the Land Acquisition Act?

Knowledge of the award does not mean mere knowledge that an award has been made; it must specifically relate to the essential contents of the award. (Para 5 )

8. Does a civil court have jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation on a reference under Section 18?

The court acknowledged a conflict of judicial opinion on whether a civil court can determine if a reference is competent based on limitation but declined to resolve the issue as it was academic. (Para 6 )

Judgement

S. K. Das, J. : This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 16 1959 passed by the Punjab High Court on an application in revision in respect of an order dated December 17,.1957 by which the learned Senior Subordinate Judge of Gurgaon held that a reference by the collector of Gurgaon under S. 18 of the Land acquisition Act (Act I of 1894) was incompetent by reason of the circumstance that it was made on an application filed beyond time. The appellant before us is the State of Punjab and the respondents are two ladies being related as mother and daughter. We shall presently state the relevant facts, but before we do so it is necessary to say that the only point on which the High Court disposed of the application in revision before it made by the respondents herein, was whether the civil court to which a reference is made by the Collector under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on an application filed beyond time, can reject the reference on the ground that the reference made is incompetent. On this point there is a conflict of judicial opinion. In disposing of the application in revision the learned single judge who heard it proceeded on the basis that he was bound by the Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu , AIR 1958 Punj 490 which held that the jurisdiction of the civil court on a reference under S. 18 was confined to considering and pronouncing upon any of the four differed objections to an award under the Act which might have been raised in the written application for the reference and the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation. Therefore the learned single Judge did not go into the further question as to whether the application made for a reference in the present case was filed beyond time or not as prescribed by the proviso to S. 18 of the Act. That question has however been agitated before us by reason of the decision in Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition officer , 1962 (1) SCR 676 a decision of this court which was not available at the time when the learned single judge of the Punjab High Court disposed of the application in revision.

2. We proceed now to state the relevant facts. The respondents who were evacuees were owners of 55 bighas and 7 biswas of land in two villages Known as Salarpur and Nasirpur in the district of Gurgaon. Their lands in the aforesaid two villages along with lands of other persons in other villages were acquired by the appellant for use as a Field Firing and Bombing Range. The respondents were not notified about the acquisition and were not present at the time of the award. The respondents alleged and this was not denied, that the Collector treated the property as evacuee property and none of the notices contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued to them. The Collector made an award on October 25, 1953 by which he allowed compensation at the rate of Rs. 96/- per acre in respect of the lands of the respondents. On December 25, 1954 that is more than a year after the award, the respondents made an application to the Collector in which they said that certain agricultural lands of villages Salarpur & Nasirpur were compulsorily acquired by the Collector by an aware dated October 30, 1953 (October 30 was presumably a mistake for October 25), but they were not given any notice of the acquisition proceedings. The respondents further stated that the award had fixed the compensation to be given to the land owners affected by the acquisition, but the amount to be paid to each owner was not apportioned therein. The respondents then referred to a judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court dated November 13, 1944 under which they were held to be the owners of the lands in question. A prayer was made on behalf of the respondents for Payment of the compensation money at an early date for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a daughter s marriage, bu
















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