SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI, AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.
Gulam Yasin Khan, Appellant
Versus
Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 936 of 1965.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Satelvad, Senior Advocate, (Mr. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; Mr. K. L. Guaba, Senior Advocate, (Mr. D. D. Verma, and M/s. S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Rai, Advocates of Ganpat Rai and Co. with him), for Respondents.
It would be unreasonable to hold that mere relationship of a person with an employee of the Municipal Committee justifies the inference that such a person bas interest, direct or indirect, in the employment under the Municipal Committee. [Para 12]
Where a separated son of a candidate is in the employment of the Municipal Committee, the enquiry is not whether the candidate has interest in the son, but the enquiry is whether the candidate is interested in the employment of the son. [Para 6]
The interest cannot mean mere sentiemental or friendly interest; It must mean interest which is pecuniary, or material, or of a similar nature. [Para 7]
A separated son of a Mohammaden candidate lived in the same house, the ration card of the candidate included his son also, but they had separate mess and the son used his income for the maintenance of his family, the fact that such son was in employment of the Municipal Committee did not incur disqualification in the candidate to seek election.
[Para 5]
Clause (1) of section 19 of the Act did not mention 'employment' specifically, but refers to any share or interest in a contract with the Muncipality while owning such share or interest in the contract. It was assumed by the Supreme Court that the contract refers to employment. [Para 7]
Judgement
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I. : The appellant, Gulam Yasin Khan, and respondent No. 1, Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar, were candidates for election as members to the Municipal Committee, Malkapur, District Buldana, from Ward No. 17. The date fixed for filing the nomination papers was 16th March, 1964, and the date for scrutiny was 18th March, 1964. Both the appellant and respondent No. 1 had filed their nomination papers as required by the relevant Rules. When the stage of scrutiny arrived, respondent No. 1 objected to the validity of the candidature of the appellant. He alleged that the appellant s son Khalidad Khan was a Moharir on Octroi Naka employed by the Municipal Committee; as such, he was a servant of the Committee. According to respondent No. 1, the employment of the appellant s son by the Municipal Committee showed that the appellant had an interest in the Municipal Committee; and son, he was disqualified from standing for election under S. 15(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (No. II of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act ). The appellant disputed the validity of this objection. He alleged that his son was not staying with him and bad no connection with him whatsoever.
2. On March 18, 1964, the Supervising Officer overruled the objection raised by respondent No. 1. He held that on the facts brought to his notice. S. 15(1) of the Act was inapplicable.
3. Aggrieved by this order respondent No. 1 filed a Special Civil Application No. 173 of 1964 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) on April 3, 1964. By his petition, respondent No.1 urged that the decision of the Supervising Officer overruling his objection to the candidature of the appellant was patently invalid in law; and so, he asked for a writ, order or direction of an appropriate nature setting aside the impugned order of the Supervising Officer and prohibiting him from holding the election from Ward No. 17 as scheduled on April 19, 1964.
4. This writ petition was resisted by the appellant on the same grounds which he had urged before the Supervising Officer. The High Court, however, upheld the objection raised by respondent No. 1, set aside the order passed by the Supervising Officer, and held that the appellant was disqualified from standing for election under S.15(1) of the Act. In consequence, it directed that the nomination paper filed by the appellant should be rejected. It appears that from Ward No. 17, only two nomination papers had been filed - one of the appellant and the other of respondent No. 1. In view of the fact that after the rejection of the nomination paper of the appellant, respondent No. 1 was the only candidate who had offered for election on behalf of Ward No. 17, the High Court declared that respondent No. 1 had been only duly elected from the said Ward. It is against this decision that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and the short question which has been argued before us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court erred in law in holding that on the facts proved in this case, the appellant was disqualified for being nominated as member of the Municipal Committee under S. 15(1) of the Act.
5. Before dealing with this point, it is relevant to refer to the facts which have either been found or admitted in the present proceedings. It appears that the appellant has three adult sons, including Khalidad Khan who has been employed by the Municipal Committee. The three sons and the father live in the same house, but mess separately. They have no share in each other s income. The earnings of the sons and the father are not put into the common hotch-pot. There are separate living arrangements in the house, and each one lives in a portion of the house allotted to him. It is true that the ration card is in the name of the appellant for the whole family, but it is admitted that the income of Rs. 2,000 which is shown in the ration
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