1. Lease dispute involving a Thika tenant — eviction suit — jurisdiction of Controller after statutory amendment — requirement of contractual notice under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1966 Supreme(SC) 217
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.I. AND J.M. SHELAT, J.
Manujendra Dutt, Appellant
Versus
Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No.586 of 1964, D/-22-9-1966.
Advocates appeared
Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate, (Mr. Sukumar Ghose, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; Mr. .Sarjoo Prasad, Senior Advocate, (Mr. D. N. Mukherjee, Advocate, with him), for Respondent.
Advocates:
C.B.AGARWAL, D.N.MUKHERJI, SARJU PRASAD, SUKUMAR GHOSH
C.B.AGARWAL, D.N.MUKHERJI, SARJU PRASAD, SUKUMAR GHOSH
Rent Acts are protective and restrictive; they do not enable landlords to evict contractual tenants without first lawfully terminating the contractual tenancy. A "non obstante" clause in such Acts does not override the requirement to provide contractually mandated notice before seeking eviction on statutory grounds.
Headnote:(A) Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 - Section 3 and 29 - Amendment Act VI of 1953 - Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 - Section 8 - Transfer of Property Act - Section 106 - Jurisdiction of Controller - Deletion of Section 29 - Effect on pending proceedings - Deletion of a section does not deprive the Controller of jurisdiction to try proceedings pending before him at the date the Amending Act came into force - Transfer of suit having been lawfully made, its deletion would not alter the law applicable to the claim in the litigation. (Para 4)
(B) Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 - Section 3 - Non obstante clause - Right to notice under lease - Rent Acts are protective and restrictive, not enabling - They do not confer new rights of action but restrict existing rights under contract or general law - A landlord is not entitled to evict a contractual tenant without first determining the contractual tenancy - The non obstante clause in Section 3 means that even where a contractual tenancy is properly terminated, the landlord cannot evict the tenant unless one or more grounds in Section 3 are satisfied - Statutory tenancy arises only after the contractual tenancy is determined. (Para 5)
(C) Lease - Notice to quit - Proviso to clause providing for notice before vacation - Where a lease provides for an option to renew and a specific notice period to vacate to allow for removal of structures, such proviso must be given effect to - Failure to provide the contractually mandated notice renders the suit for eviction unsustainable. (Paras 6, 7)
Facts of the case:
A tenant entered into a fixed-term lease of 10 years which included an option for renewal and a proviso requiring six months' notice if the tenant was required to vacate. After the term expired and renewal was not agreed upon, the landlord sought eviction. The suit was transferred to a Controller under a specific section of a tenancy act, which was later deleted by an amendment. The landlord sought eviction based on statutory grounds, arguing that the statutory provisions overrode the contractual requirement for notice.
Findings of Court:
The deletion of the section transferring the suit did not divest the Controller of jurisdiction over pending matters. However, the statutory grounds for eviction do not exempt the landlord from the obligation to first terminate the contractual tenancy via the notice period stipulated in the lease.
Issues: (1) Whether the deletion of Section 29 of the Act deprived the Controller of jurisdiction over pending proceedings; (2) Whether the non obstante clause in Section 3 of the Act absolved the landlord from the obligation to provide the contractually agreed six-month notice.
Ratio Decidendi: Rent Acts are social legislation intended to protect tenants and are restrictive rather than enabling. They do not grant landlords the right to bypass the termination of a contractual lease. The "notwithstanding" clause in the Act ensures that even after a lease is lawfully terminated, the landlord must still prove statutory grounds for eviction. Thus, the contractual right to notice must be honored before statutory protections are invoked.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether deletion of Section 29 deprived the Controller of jurisdiction and whether the non-obstante clause in Section 3 overrides the contractual requirement for a six-month notice. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 )
3. Deletion of Section 29 does not affect pending proceedings; Rent Acts are protective social legislation that restrict rather than enable landlord's rights to evict contractual tenants. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 )
4. A landlord must first terminate a contractual tenancy via required notice before seeking eviction under the protective grounds of a Rent Act. (Para 5 , 7 )
5. Appeal allowed — High Court judgment set aside — suit for eviction dismissed. (Para 9 )
6. Does the deletion of a section providing for the transfer of a suit to a Controller deprive the Controller of jurisdiction over pending proceedings?
No. The deletion of such a section does not affect pending proceedings or deprive the Controller of jurisdiction over matters already lawfully transferred, as the transfer was lawfully made and the law applicable to the claim remains unaltered. (Para 4 )
7. What is the nature and purpose of Rent Acts like the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act?
Rent Acts are protective social legislation intended to prevent indiscriminate eviction and safeguard tenants' security of possession. They are restrictive rather than enabling, conferring no new rights of action but restricting existing rights under contract or general law. (Para 5 , 7 )
8. Does a non-obstante clause in a Rent Act allow a landlord to evict a contractual tenant without first terminating the lease via contractual notice?
No. A landlord must first validly terminate the contractual tenancy through the required notice. The statutory grounds for eviction under the Rent Act are additional restrictions that must be satisfied even after the contractual tenancy is properly terminated. (Para 5 , 7 , 8 )
9. Is a notice to quit required if a lease expires by efflux of time but contains a specific notice proviso?
Yes. If a lease provides a specific notice period to allow the tenant to remove structures upon expiry, that proviso must be given effect to ensure the tenant has a fair opportunity to dispose of structures. (Para 6 )
Judgement
SHELAT, J. : Two questions arise in this appeal by certificate granted by the High Court at Calcutta, (1) as regards the jurisdiction of the Controller under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, after the deletion therefrom of Section 29 by Amendment Act of 1953 in respect of proceedings pending before him on that date and (2) the right of a Thika Tenant as defined by the Act to a notice provided under the deed of lease.
2. By a registered lease, dated December 4, 1934, the appellant entered into possession of the land demised thereunder from the Bhowanipore Wards Estate which was then managing the said property at a monthly rent of Rs. 47-0-3 P. The lease was for a fixed term of 10 years and it inter alia gave the tenant option of renewal of the said lease provided he offered the maximum rent which might he offered by intending tenants on expiry of the said term. Clause 7 of the deed of lease provided that the lessee shall be bound on the termination or sooner determination of the lease to restore to the lessors the land demised after removing the structures with drains, privies, water taps etc., leaving the land in the same state as it was at the date of the lease. It also provided that the lessee would be bound to sell the said structures, privies, drains etc. to the lessors if the lessors so desired at a valuation to be fixed by a qualified Engineer specified therein. Clause 7 then provided as follows.
Provided always and it is hereby agreed and declared that if it be required that the lessee should vacate the said premises at the end of the said term of 10 years the lessee will be served with a 6 months notice ending with the expiry of the said term and it is further agreed that if the lessee is permitted to hold over the land after the expiry of the said term of 10 years the lessee wil1 bc allowed a six months notice to quit and vacate the said premises."
It is clear that the lessee was entitled to a six months notice in the following two events before he could be required to vacate: (1) If the lessors desired the lessee to vacate at the end of ten years and not to renew the lease, they were bound to give six months notice ending with the expiry of the term of 10 years and (2) if on the expiry of the term the lease was not renewed but the lessee was allowed to holdover the lessors were bound to give him six months notice before being asked to quit. After the execution of the said lease the appellant built certain structures on some portion of the said land and let out the remaining portion as permitted under the said lease. .Since the said period of ten years was to expire on December 1, 1914, the appellant by his letter, dated November 30, 1944, to the Bhowanipore Wards Estate expressed his desire to exercise his option of renewal stating therein that he was prepared to pay such higher rent as the lessors had by that time received. According to the appellant. since he did not receive any reply to the said offer he continued to be in possession of the demised land and as was the practice between the parties, continued to deposit the aforesaid rent form time to time in the treasury of Alipore Collectorate. On May 26, 1945. the Manager of the Wards Estate intimated to the appellant that the renewal of the said lease was not sanctioned and asked the appellant if he was agreeable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 12 per month per Cottah and a Selami equivalent to one year s rent. The appellant wrote back to say that he had already exercised his option, that he had been regularly depositing the said rent and that the said demand was excessive and he was therefore not bound to pay the same. Considerable correspondence thereafter ensued between the parties ending with the notice, dated October 14, 1946, by the said Wards Estate stating that as the appellant did not agree to pay the rent as demanded by them and the said lease was not renewed he was a trespasser and was not entitled to any notice under the said lease and
