JUDGMENT

JASWANT SINGH, J.:— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated November 19, 1970 of the High Court of Delhi rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 373 of 1969 setting aside the order dated April 23, 1969 of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, rejecting respondent No. 1s application under S. 33 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) seeking approval of its order of the appellants dismissal from service passed during the pendency of an industrial dispute.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are : Behind the premises situate on Najafgarh Road, Delhi of respondent No. 1 which is a unit of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company) there is a plot of land admeasuring 181 acres, ownership whereof was transferred in favour of the Company by the erstwhile Delhi Improvement Trust (now constituted as Delhi Development Authority) vide sale deed dated May 20, 1964. The plot being adjacent to the premises of respondent No. 1, the same was being looked after by the management of the respondent which also constructed some quarters thereon for the use of its employees. There are also some jhuggies (hutments) standing on the land in which live 172 families out of which 70 are of the employees of respondent No. 1 and the rest are of some outsiders. After taking over the watch and ward of the plot, the management of respondent No. 1 posted some sentries to prevent encroachment and unauthorised construction thereon. On the Companys taking up construction of a boundary wall on the aforesaid plot in April or May, 1967, the appellant, who was the President (Pradhan) of the Jhuggi Jhoupari Sudhar Sabha and a few other jhuggi dwellers brought a suit, being suit No. 418 of 1967 in the court of the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi for injunction restraining the Company and respondent No. 1 from constructing the boundary wall and from evicting them from the jhuggies. On the basis of the voluntary statement made on behalf of the Company to the effect that it would not evict the appellant and his co-plaintiffs except by a due process of law, the Sub-Judge issued a temporary injunction restraining the Company and respondent No. 1 from evicting the appellant and his co-plaintiffs except by a due process of law but refused their prayer for injunction restraining the Company and respondent No. 1 from building the boundary wall. The Sub-Judge, however, directed the Company and respondent No. 1 to leave 10 feet wide gate for the passage of the appellant and his co-plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the rejection of their prayer with regard to issue of injunction regarding construction of the boundary wall, the appellant and his co-plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, who dismissed the same by his order dated February 28, 1968 observing :

"The dispute between the parties is only regarding the construction of the boundary wall along the Najafgarh Drain. This boundary wall is admittedly sought to be constructed by the defendant-respondents in their own land and the plaintiffs appellants did not claim any right of ownership in the site on which the Jhuggies existed or on which the wall in question is sought to be constructed. The appellants had not claimed any right of easement or irrevocable licence against the construction of this wall and so, they do not appear to have any right to compel the defendants-respondents not to construct this wall. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended before me that their passage from the jhuggies towards the Najafgarh Drain would be obstructed by the construction of this wall. The learned trial court, it appears, ordered the defendant to leave a gate of about 10 feet width for the passage of the jhuggi dwellers, while constructing the boundary wall in question. The learned trial court exercised the discretion keeping in view the right of the defendants to c