Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, CJI. :- This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit for partition filed by the appellant in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palghat. The suit properties belonged originally to Ravunni Nair, the father of appellant and of defendants 1, 2, 11 and 20. Defendants 3 to 10, 12 to 19 and 21 to 28 are members of the tavazhi of Defendants 2, 11 and 20 respectively. The parties are admittedly governed by the Madras Marumakkattayam Act, 1932.

2. On October 10, 1945 Revunni Nair executed a Will, Ex. B-8, making certain disposition of his properties, including that in the suit. After his death, his widow Sreedevi Amma, the mother of appellant and defendants 1, 2, 11 and 20 entered into possession of the suit property. On 15th January, 1959 she executed a Will Ex. B-4, bequeathing that property to defendant 1. Her right to so dispose of the property depends upon the nature of the estate conferred upon her under the Will of her husband, Ex. B-8. If she obtained under her husbands Will a limited estate in his property, she will have no right to dispose of that property. On the other hand if, under her husbands Will, she got an absolute estate, she will be entitled to dispose of that property.

3. The trial court and the District Court accepted the appellants contention that Ravunni Nair by his Will gave a limited estate only to Sreedevi Amma and therefore, she had no right to dispose of that property. In second appeal No. 1039 of 1964, the High Court of Kerala took a different view and dismissed the appellants suit on the ground that, by his Will, Ravunni Nair had conferred an absolute estate on Sreedevi Amma and she was, therefore, entitled to dispose of that property. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court.

4. Paragraph 5 of Ravunni Nairs Will, Ex. B-8, contains a recital that the property described therein "shall vest in my wife, Sreedevi Amma, daughter of Moorkkath Madhavi Amma, with power of alienation." We are unable to appreciate how, in the face of this recital, it is possible to accept the appellants contention that the testator intended to confer a limited estate only on his wife. The fact that the power of alienation was expressly given to her militates against the appellants contention that the testator intended to confer upon her a limited interest in his property.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon clauses 6 and 7 of the Will in support of his contention that though the power of alienation was given to the widow, the true intention of the testator was to give to the other heirs also a share in the property which was bequeathed to her. It is not possible to accept this contention because, clauses 6 and 7 of the Will on which counsel relies, deal with the income of the property and not with the corpus. The corpus has been dealt with in paragraph 5 of the Will under which, by words of unambiguous import, an unrestricted estate is bequeathed to Sreedvi Amma. The Will shows that she was of advanced years and, therefore, the testator wanted to make some provision for the application of the recurring income of the property. Clauses 6 and 7 of the Will deal with that mater. The Will contains a provision for the maintenance and upkeep of a house which was used by the family as a place of worship. Clauses 6 and 7 provide, inter alia, that defendant 1, Shivaraman should invest the balance of the income and that income should be shared in a certain manner by the heirs as specified in those clauses. The corpus itself was bequeathed absolutely to the wife. If there was any conflict between the different provisions of the Will, it may have become necessary to reconcile the conflicting clauses of the Will, as stated in the decision of this Court in Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul (1976) 2 SCR 924 . But we see no inconsistency between the various provisions of the Will and are in agreement with the High Court that, upon a true construction of the Will, the intention wh