V.BOSE, J.

(1) THE defendants, Santosh Kumar and the Northern General Agencies, were granted special leave to appeal. The plaintiff filed the suit out of which the appeal arises on the basis of a cheque for Rs. 60,000.00 drawn by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff and which, on presentation to the Bank, was dishonoured.

(2) THE suit was filed in the court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, under 0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) THE defendants applied for leave to defend the suit under r. 3 of that Order.

(4) THE learned trial Judge held that ` the defence raised by the defendants raises a triable issue,` but he went on to hold that the defendants ` have not placed anything on the file to show that the defence was a bona fide one.` Accordingly, he permitted the defendants to appear and defend the suit on the condition of their giving security to the extent of the suit amount and the costs of the suit.`

(5) THE defendants applied for a review but failed. They then applied under Art. 227 of the Constitution to the Delhi Circuit bench of the Punjab High court and failed again. As a result, they applied here under Art. 136 and were granted special leave.

(6) AT first blush, 0. XXXVII, r. 2(2), appears drastically to curtail a litigants normal rights in a court of justice, namely to appear and defend himself as of right, if and when sued, because it says that when a suit is instituted on a bill of exchange, hundi or a promissory note under the provisions of sub-rule (1) `..... the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend.` But the rigour of that is softened by r. 3(1) which makes it obligatory on the court to grant leave when the conditions set out there are fulfilled. Clause (1) runs- ` The court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and to defend the suit, upon affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient to support the application.` But no sooner is the wide discretion given to the court in r. 2(2) narrowed down by r. 3(1) than it is again enlarged in another direction by r. 3(2) which says that ` Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to payment into court, giving security, framing and recording issues or otherwise as the court thinks fit.` The learned counsel for the plaintiff argues that the discretion so conferred by r. 3(2) is unfettered and that as the discretion has been exercised by the learned trial Judge, no appeal can lie against it unless there is a ` grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law` and he quotes D. N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee (1) and Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (2).

(7) NOW what we are examining here are laws of procedure. The spirit in which questions about procedure are to be approached and the manner in which rules relating to them are to be interpreted are laid down in Sangrayn Singh v. Election tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya (1). ` Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a, thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of S. that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and