1. Application for directions to sell trust cattle and lease lands for economy — Dispute over jurisdiction under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 1 , 3 , 4 )
1965 Supreme(SC) 246
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B.Gajendragadkar, C.J.I., J.C.Shah, K.N.Wanchoo, M.Hidayatullah, S.M.Sikri, JJ.
Chairman Madappa
Versus
M.N.Mahanthadevaru
Case No. : 957 of 1963
Date of Decision : 10/11/65
Advocates Appeared: Jain B.D. : Krishnamurthy V. : Krishnan R.Gopal
B.D.Jain, R.GOPAL KRISHNAN, V.KRISHNAMURTHY
Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure does not restrict the power of trustees to perform ordinary administration of trust property or the jurisdiction of a court to provide directions for such administration if expressly permitted by the trust's management scheme.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 92(1)(f) - Public Trust - Ordinary administration of trust property - Power of managers to dispose of movable property and lease lands to maximize income - Jurisdiction of the court to give directions under a settled scheme - Whether a separate suit under Section 92 is necessary for acts of ordinary administration - Section 92(1)(f) does not circumscribe the right of trustees or managers to carry out ordinary administration of trust property, including letting, selling, mortgaging, or exchanging such property for the benefit of the trust (Paras 10, 11).
(B) Scheme for management of trust - Provisions allowing managers to apply for directions to the court for carrying out the scheme - Such provisions are valid and allow the court to give directions on ordinary administration without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras 6, 9).
Facts of the case:
A scheme was settled for the management of a religious institution, appointing two joint managers. One manager applied to the District Court for directions to sell cattle and lease out lands via public auction to reduce expenses and increase income. The other manager objected, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction under Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure and that a formal suit was required for such authorizations.
Findings of Court:
The directions sought were in the nature of ordinary administration of the institution. The scheme specifically provided that managers could apply for directions to the District Court to carry out the scheme, and the court had the power to give such directions to maximize the income of the institution.
Issues: Whether the provisions of Section 92(1)(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure prohibit a court from giving directions for the ordinary administration of a public trust when the trust scheme expressly allows for such directions.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 92(1)(f) is intended to provide a remedy for breach of trust or general improvement of administration and does not strip managers of their power to conduct ordinary administration. Requiring a full suit for every administrative act, such as selling obsolete items or crops, would make trust management impossible. Where a scheme provides for court directions to facilitate administration, such directions can be sought and granted without a separate suit under Section 92.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the court has jurisdiction to grant directions for ordinary administration under a trust scheme or if a separate suit under Section 92, CPC is mandatory. (Para 2 , 5 )
3. Provisions in a trust scheme allowing court directions for ordinary administration are valid and do not conflict with the requirements of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 )
4. Section 92(1)(f), CPC does not circumscribe the power of trustees to carry out ordinary administration of trust property or the court's power to give directions thereunder. (Para 11 )
5. Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment upholding the District Judge's jurisdiction to give directions for ordinary administration affirmed. (Para 12 )
6. Can a trust scheme provide for modifications or directions without a separate suit under Section 92, CPC?
Yes, if the modification is for the purpose of administration, it can be made by an application under the relevant clause of the scheme without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 6 )
7. Does Section 92(1)(f) of the CPC prohibit trustees from performing ordinary administration of trust property?
No, Section 92(1)(f) does not take away the right of trustees or managers to carry out ordinary administration, such as selling movable property or leasing land to maximize trust income, as requiring a suit for every such act would be absurd. (Para 11 )
8. What is the purpose of the relief provided under Section 92(1)(f) of the CPC?
It is intended to provide court authority for alienating trust property in situations where there may be a prohibition in the trust deed or where court sanction is specifically necessary for the alienation. (Para 11 )
K.N.WANCHOO, J.
(1) THIS is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Mysore High court. Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. There is a muth in village Davanur. A suit was brought in 1942 under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for framing a scheme for the management of the muth. A decree was passed on 17/03/1948 by the High court by which a scheme was settled and two persons were appointed as joint managers thereunder. In 1959 the two managers were the appellant Madappa who was the chairman and the respondent Mahanthadevaru. On 12/05/1959, the respondent made an application to the Additional District Judge, Mysore, in which he said that there were more than 100 heads of cattle, belonging to the muth. But the estimated income of the properties was barely sufficient to meet the cost of worship of the deity and that no funds were available to maintain the cattle. He also said that it was unnecessary and expensive to incur the feeding charges and pay for the staff needed to take care of the cattle. He therefore prayed for an order for the sale of cattle as a measure of economy and practical utility. Further it appears that there were some lands belonging to the muth, which were being cultivated through servants. It was suggested in this application that the lands might be leased out for cultivation for one year by public auction for cash consideration in order to increase the income of the muth.
(2) ON this application, notice was issued to the appellant. He objected that the application had been made without consulting him. He also objected to the sale of the cattle, his reason being that their upkeep did not involve any expenditure and that they were necessary for the supply of milk to the muth and also as the chief source of manure for the lands. He also added that it would be sacrilegious to sell them away. He further objected to the leasing out of the lands of the muth year by year on the ground that according to the existing practice, lands of the muth were being cultivated and the crops harvested by the people of the village and there was no expenditure to the muth in that behalf. It appears that thereafter there were consultations between the two managers in order to meet the charge that the respondent had, not consulted the appellant before making the application. But the two managers were unable to agree.
(3) THEREUPON the Additional District Judge heard both parties, and by his order, dated 7/06/1960, directed that keeping hundreds of cattle with no proper arrangements to look after them would result in great loss to the muth. He therefore ordered that ten milch cows might be retained for the use of the muth for the purpose of milk and the remainder sold by public auction. As to cultivation of lands, the Additional District Judge was of the view that by the method of carrying on cultivation with the cooperation of villagers the muth stood to lose. He therefore ordered that the right of cultivation of lands belonging to the muth be sold for- cash from year to year.
(4) THEREUPON the appellant went in revision to the High court. Apart from challenging the correctness of the order made by the, Additional District Judge, the appellant further contended that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to make such an order in view of the provisions of s. 92(1) cl. (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High court held in view of paragraphs (11) and (12) in the scheme that the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order which he did. Further it refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Additional, District Judge in the matter. The appellant then obtained special-, leave from this court; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
(5) THE only point urged on behalf of the appellant is that in view of s. 92(1), cl. (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure the Additional, District Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order which h