1. Extension of a state sales tax act to a union territory via legislation allowing for amendments by the state legislature prior to the act's commencement. (Para 1 , 2 , 16 , 17 )
1967 Supreme(SC) 45
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.Subba Rao, C.J.I., G.K.Mitter, J.C.Shah, J.M.Shelat, V.Bhargava, JJ.
B.Shama Rao
Versus
Union Territory Of Pondicherry
Case No. : 123 of 1966
Date of Decision : 2/20/67
Advocates Appeared: Dadachanji J.B. : Desai S.T. : Dutta B. : Mathur O.G. : Narain Ravindra : Narayanaswamy K. : Sachthey R.N. : Sen B. : Setalvad M.C.
B.DUTTA, B.SEN, J.B.DADACHAN, K.NARAYANASWAMY, M.C.SETALVAD, O.G.MATHUR, R.N.SACH, Ravindra Narayan, S.T.DESAI
A legislature cannot abdicate its essential legislative function by adopting another state's law and allowing future amendments to apply without its own review. Such legislation is void ab initio and cannot be revived by a subsequent amending act.
Headnote:(A) Principal Act - Sections 1(2), 2(1), 2(2); State Act; Amendment Act; Union Territories Act; Constitution of India - Article 239
(B) Legislative power and delegation - A legislature may delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers but cannot abdicate its essential legislative function. Abdication occurs when a legislature shifts the onus of legislation to another body, effectively effacing itself from the legislative process. (Paras 4, 5, 8)
(C) Void ab initio legislation - A statute that is void from its inception (stillborn) cannot be revived or resuscitated by a subsequent amending act. (Paras 13, 14)
Facts of the case:
A merchant challenged the validity of a sales tax act. The local legislature had adopted a sales tax act of another state, providing that the act as amended up to the date of commencement (to be notified by the government) would apply. The petitioner contended that this wholesale adoption, including future amendments made by another legislature, amounted to an abdication of legislative function.
Findings of Court:
The court found that by adopting a law and allowing it to be amended by another legislature before its commencement, the local legislature surrendered its power, as it could not predict the nature of such amendments. The Principal Act was thus void and stillborn. The subsequent Amendment Act, which attempted to fix the commencement date and validate taxes, could not revive a void act.
Issues: Whether the adoption of another state's act, including future amendments made prior to the commencement date, constitutes an abdication of legislative power and whether a subsequent amendment can validate a stillborn act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the total surrender of the power to determine the law in favor of another legislature constitutes abdication. Since the adopting legislature could not anticipate the amendments made by the other state's legislature, it failed to discharge its entrusted function. Consequently, the act was void ab initio and could not be resuscitated by a later amendment.
Result: Petitions allowed with costs.
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2. Whether adopting another state's act, including future amendments prior to commencement, constitutes abdication of legislative function and excessive delegation of power. (Para 3 , 17 , 19 )
3. Adopting a statute and accepting future amendments by another legislature before commencement demonstrates non-application of mind and a total surrender of legislative power. (Para 8 , 10 , 14 )
4. Legislative adoption of another legislature's act, including future amendments prior to commencement, amounts to abdication of legislative function, rendering the statute void and stillborn. (Para 8 , 10 )
5. Petition allowed; the principal act held void and stillborn, and the subsequent amendment act found incapable of reviving the void legislation. (Para 11 , 14 , 15 )
6. When does the adoption of another legislature's law constitute an abdication of legislative function?
Abdication occurs when a legislature not only adopts an existing act but provides that the law applicable to its territory shall be the act as amended in the future by another legislature, reflecting a refusal to discharge its entrusted function and a non-application of mind. (Para 8 , 10 )
7. Can a subsequent amendment act revive a principal act that was void ab initio?
No; if a principal act is void and stillborn, a subsequent act that purports to amend it rather than independently re-enact it as a new law cannot resuscitate or validate the void legislation. (Para 13 , 14 )
8. What is the distinction between permissible delegation and impermissible abdication of legislative power?
Permissible delegation involves seeking assistance from subordinate agencies for details while preserving legislative capacity; abdication occurs when the legislature shifts the onus of legislation or effaces itself in favor of another legislative body. (Para 4 , 5 , 9 )
SHELAT J.M.,J.
(1) ON 16/08/1962 the administration of Pondicherry became vested in the government of India by virtue of de jure transfer. The Pondicherry Administration Act, 42 of 1962 constituted that territory as a separate centrally administered unit and under the Union Territories Act, 20 of 1963 a legislative assembly wag set up for that area. The assembly under that Act acquired the power of enacting laws in respect of items in Lists 11 and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The assembly thereafter passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 10 of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) which was published on 3/06/1965 after receiving the Presidents assent on 25/05/1965. Section 1(2) of that Act provided that the Act would come into force on such date as the government may notification appoint Section 2 (1) provided that:`The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (No. 1 of 1,959) (hereinafter refered to as the Act) as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of this Act shall extend to and come into force in the Union Territory of Pondichery subjectto thefollowingmodifications and. adaptations,.............` Then follow certain modification and adaptations which are not relevant for out purposes except that cl. (ix.) of sec. (2)(1) substituted Sec. 30 of the Madras Act and provided for an Appellate tribunal. The substituted section laid down that the government shall appoint a Judicial officer who is otherwise qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the tribunal Superieur dAppeal to be the Appellate Tribunal and to exercise the functions conferred under the Act The Act also enacted a Schedule with description of goods, the point of levy and the rates at which the tax was to be levied. Sec 2(2) provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959 and any other Rules made or issued under the said Act and similarly in force were to apply to Pondicherry. As provided by section 1(2)the Pondicherry government issued a notification dated 1/03/1966 bringing into force the Madras Act as extended by the Act to Pondicherry as from 1/04/1966. In the meantime the Madras legislature had amended the Madras Act and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended upto April 1, 1966 which was brought into force under the said notification.
(2) THE petitioner is a merchant carrying on business in liquor and would be a dealer within the meaning of the Madras Act. Upto March 1966 he was liable and was paying certain taxes similar to the sales tax under the French regulations till then in force in Pondicherry. With the coming into force of the Principal Act he was served with a notice to register himself as a dealer. Thereupon he filed this petition challenging the validity of the Principal Act.
(3) MR. S. T. Desai for the petitioner contended that the Principal Act was void and was a still-born legislation by reason of the Pondicherry legislature having abdicated its legislative function in favour of the Madras State Legislature, that such abdication resulted from the wholesale adoption of the Madras Act as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the Principal Act and that Sec. 2(1) read with sec. 1(2) meant that the legislature adopted not only the Madras Act as it was when it enacted the Principal Act but also such amendment or amendments in that Act which might be passed by the Madras Legislature upto the time of the commencement of the Act, i.e., upto 1/04/1966. Mr. Setalvad, on the other hand, relied on the majority decision in in re. Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc. case (1) and in particular on the summary by Bose J. in Raj Narain Singhs case(2) of the diverse views expressed by the learned Judges in that decision. As heading (4) in the said summary shows the learned Judges inter alia held by a majority of 5 to 2 that authorisation to select and apply future Provincial laws was not invalid. To ascertain the principle deducible fro