2007 Supreme(SC) 8

2007(1) Supreme 52
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Rajasthan High Court)
S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju, JJ.
Deewan Singh & Ors.—Appellants
versus
Rajendra Pd. Ardevi & Ors.—Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095 of 2002
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4076-4079 of 2002
Civil Appeal Nos. 4081-4084 of 2002
Civil Appeal Nos. 4086-4089 of 2002
Decided on 4-1-2007
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Shyam Divan, Mukul Rohtagi, Ashok H. Desai, Sr. Advocates, Ashok Kumar Jain, P.R. Porwal, Ravindra Bana, P.K. Manohar, Manoj Goel, D.K. Jain, Shuvodeep Roy, Wajeeh Shafiq, Sushil Jain, Manoj Goel, Sushil Kumar Jain, Mrs. Pratibha Jain and Surya Kant, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
The State Government is obligated to constitute a committee of management of a public trust to which Chapter X of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 applies and the Constitution of such a committee of management does not fall within the discretionary jurisdiction of the State Government.

Headnote:(i) Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959—Sections 52 to 65—Rajasthan Public Trusts Rules, 1962—Management of a Jain temple situated in State of Rajasthan notified by State Government—Obligation of State, not discretion—Committee of Management not constituted within a reasonable time—Writ petitions—State in exercise of its power u/s 52 of the Act notified the said temple by a notification dated 25.6.1981—By a judgment and order, Single Judge of the High Court directed the State to constitute Committee for management u/s 53 of the Act—Division Bench of the High Court made certain modifications in regard to constitution of Committee leaving the matter at the discretion of State Government opining Sections 52 and 53 of the Act confer such discretion to it—Whether State Government is obligated to constitute a committee of management of a public trust to which Chapter X of the Act applies—(Yes)—State Government does not have any discretionary jurisdiction to exercise in the matter of appointment of a committee of management—Expression ‘shall’ used in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 53 of the Act, implies imperative character of law.

       Held : Section 53 of the Act provides for management of trusts to which Chapter X applies. Once application of Chapter X is conceptualized by issuance of a notification in terms of Section 52 of the Act, indisputably Section 53 would be attracted. As indicated hereinbefore, whereas the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that it is imperative on the part of the State Government to issue an appropriate notification constituting a committee of management in respect of the temple in question, the Division Bench opined that some element of discretion exists in the State Government. A plain reading of the provisions of Section 53 of the Act would show that it contemplates vesting of public trust in the State Government. Different dates may be appointed for different purposes. Once Chapter X is found to be applicable, subject to fixation of an appointed date, the management vests in a committee. Such a committee of management is to be constituted by the State Government in the manner provided therein. The said provision contains a non-obstante clause and, therefore, the same would prevail over anything contained in any provision of the Act or in any law, custom or usage in force. (Paras 25 and 26)

       The State Government, in our opinion, does not have any discretionary jurisdiction to exercise in the matter of appointment of a committee of management. It is imperative in nature. The expression "shall" used in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 53 of the Act indicates that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature require that a committee of management must be constituted. The expression "shall" ordinarily implies the imperative character of the law. (Para 27)

       The stand of the State in the earlier round of ligitation was that the temple in question was a Hindu temple. This Court categorically opined that it is a Jain temple. The principles of res judicata, thus, would come into play. The State, therefore, cannot still contend that the temple in question is a Hindu temple. Before us, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in Civil Appeal No. 4086-4089 of 2002 have raised a contention that it is a Hindu temple but we cannot permit the State or the said respondents to raise such a contention before us. We are bound by the earlier judgment. The issue cannot be permitted to be reopened nor we have any jurisdiction in these matters to do so.

       We must, however, observe that the question as to whether the temple in question is Swetambers or Digambers does not fall for our consideration. Both parties have staked their own claims. It is for the State to act in terms of the statute. While doing so, it indisputably would have to give effect to the directions issued by the High Court.(Paras 47 and 48)

       For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the modifications made by the Division Bench of the High Court are not sustainable. They are set aside accordingly. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld. (Para 50)

       (ii) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—Public Body—A statutory authority must act within the four corners of the statute—Any action by a statutory authority contrary or inconsistent with the provisions of the statute would be void—In the matter of construction of a statute, the court shall not take recourse to a principle which would render acts of a statutory authority void in law.(Para 36)

       (iii) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—Statutory Authority—Not an agency of the State—Agency of a State would ordinarily mean an instrumentality of a State—It must be a separate legal entity—Agency of a State would mean a body which exercises public functions.

       Held : A statutory authority cannot, in absence of the provisions of a statute, be treated to be an agency of the State. It is one thing to say that the State exercises statutory control over the functions of a statute but it is another thing to say that thereby an agency is created which would be separate in entity over which the State exercises control. Agency of a State would ordinarily mean an instrumentality of a State. It must be a separate legal entity. A statutory authority does not answer the description of an agency under the control of the State. The expression agency in the context of the statutory scheme would not mean that there would exist a relationship of principal and agent between it and the State. Agency of a State would mean a body which exercises public functions. It would itself be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The concept of an agency in the context of Section 77 of the Act must be considered having regard to the fact that the statute contemplates grant of exemption to a public trust, management whereof vests inter alia in a local authority.(Paras 37 and 38)

       (iv) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES—Literal Rule—Golden rule of interpretation—Where literal interpretation shall give rise to an anomaly or absurdity, the same should be avoided—Entire statute must be first read as a whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word—Relevant provisions of the statute must, thus, be read harmoniously.

       Held : Although golden rule of interpretation, viz., literal rule should be given effect to, if it is to be held that the Devasthan Commissioner appointed under Section 7 of the Act would be an agency of the State, the same would lead to an absurdity or anomaly. It is a well-known principle of law that where literal interpretation shall give rise to an anomaly or absurdity, the same should be avoided. (Para 39)

       (v) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES—Harmonious Construction—Different provisions contained in different chapters of the Act must, as far as possible, receive harmonious construction.(Para 41)