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Supreme Court of India
B.S. CHAUHAN & S.A. BOBDE, JJ.
Basawaraj & Others – Appellants
Versus
The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013 with Civil Appeal No. 6975 of 2013
Decided On : 22-08-2013
Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 54 - Condonation of delay- Appeal preferred after about 5-1/2 years - One of the appellants had taken ill- The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Para 9)
Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 -Condonation of delay- It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. (Para 12)
Where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. (Para 15)
Facts of the case:
The appeals before the High Court were time barred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as the same had been preferred after about 5-1/2 years and no satisfactory explanation was furnished in the applications for condonation of delay for not approaching the court in time. The only explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated stage has been that one of the appellants had taken ill. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court ought to have kept in view that in a large number of identical matters, huge delays had been condoned on the condition that the claimant would not be entitled for interest of the delay period, thus, the High Court itself has given discriminatory and contradictory verdicts which itself is a good ground for interference by this Court.
Findings of the Court:
The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
Result : Apeeal dismissed.
Judgment :-
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. These appeals have been preferred against the common impugned judgment and order dated 10.6.2011 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Gulbarga in MFA Nos.10765 and 10766 of 2007 by which the appeals of the appellants under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) have been dismissed on the ground of limitation.
2. For the purpose of convenience, the facts of C.A. No. 6974 of 2013 are taken, which are as under:
A. The land of the appellants in Survey No.417/2 admeasuring 4 acres and Survey No.418 admeasuring 23 acres, 1 guntha; and 5 acres, 23 gunthas of phut kharab situated in the revenue estate of village Mahagaon, Tehsil and Distt. Gulbarga was acquired in pursuance of notification dated 23.4.1994 under Section 4(1) of the Act.
B. After completing the formalities as required under the Act, an award under Section 11 of the Act was made on 23.10.1997 fixing the market value of the land at the rate of Rs.11,500/- per acre and Rs.100/- per acre in respect of phut kharab land.
C. The appellants preferred references under Section 18(1) of the Act for enhancement of compensation and the reference court vide award dated 28.2.2002 fixed the market value of the land from Rs.31,500/- to Rs.70,000/- per acre depending upon the quality and geographical situation of the land. For phut kharab land, assessment was made at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per acre.
D. Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court on 16.8.2007 with applications for condonation of delay. The applications for condonation of delay stood rejected as the High Court did not find any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
Hence, these appeals.
3. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that the High Court committed an error in not condoning the delay as there was sufficient cause for not approaching the High Court within time. One of the appellants was suffering from ailments and it was in itself a good ground for condonation of delay. The High Court ought to have kept in view that in a large number of identical matters, huge delays had been condoned on the condition that the claimant would not be entitled for interest of the delay period, thus, the High Court itself has given discriminatory and contradictory verdicts which itself is a good ground for interference by this Court. The appeals deserve to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Shri Naveen R. Nath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeal contending that the delay can be condoned keeping in mind the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1963’). The order of condonation of delay is to be based on sound legal parameters laid down by this Court. No condition can be imposed while condoning the delay. The question whether a claimant should be awarded interest or not would arise at the time of final hearing of the appeal and such condition cannot be imposed for admitting a time barred appeal. If the High Court has committed such a grave error in other cases, that cannot be a ground for interference by this Court as it is a settled legal proposition that doctrine of equality does not apply for perpetuating an illegal and erroneous order. The appeals before the High Court were hopelessly time barred as the same had been preferred after about 5-1/2 years and no satisfactory explanation could be furnished in the applications for condonation of delay for not approaching the court in time. Thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. Admittedly, there was a delay of 5-1/2 years in filing the said appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court. The only explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated stage has
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