SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. ABDUL NAZEER, SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.
SATYA DEO @ BHOOREY – APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH – RESPONDENTS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.860 OF 2019
Decided on : 07-10-2020
(A) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 25 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 6 – Juvenility of accused – Section 25 is a non-obstante clause which applies to all proceedings in respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement of the 2015 Act (31st December 2015) – Use of word ‘any’ before Board or court in Section 25 of 2015 Act, would mean and include any court including appellate court or a court before which revision petition is pending – Section 25 of 2015 Act applies to proceedings before Board or court – It would include any court, including appellate court or court where revision petition is pending – In context of Section 25, expression ‘court’ is not restricted to mean a civil court which has jurisdiction in matter of ‘adoption’ and ‘guardianship’ in terms of clause (23) to Section 2 of 2015 Act – Accused cannot be denied his right to be treated as a juvenile when he was less than eighteen years of age at the time of commission of offence, a right which he acquired and has fructified under 2000 Act, even if offence was committed prior to enforcement of 2000 Act on 01.04.2001 – In terms of Section 25 of 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue to apply and govern proceedings which were pending when 2015 Act was enforced. (Para 17)
(B) Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Sections 2(l) and 20(Now Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 25) – Juvenility of accused – Under 2000 Act, age on date of commission of offence is determining factor – 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding instituted under 1986 Act in any court or authority, if the person had not completed eighteen years of age as on 1st April 2001, when 2000 Act came into force – Reckoning date for determination of age of juvenile is date of offence and not date when he is produced before authority or in a court – Expression ‘all pending cases’ includes not only trial but even subsequent proceedings by way of appeal, revision etc. or any other criminal proceedings – 2000 Act applies even to cases where accused was a juvenile on date of commission of offence but had ceased to be a juvenile on or before date of commencement of 2000 Act – In even such cases, provisions of 2000 Act are to apply as if these provisions were in force for all purposes and at all material time when offence was committed – In respect of pending cases, Section 20 authoritatively commands that court must at any stage, even post judgment by trial court when matter is pending in appeal, revision or otherwise, consider and decide upon question of juvenility – Juvenility is determined by age on date of commission of offence – Factum that juvenile was an adult on date of enforcement of 2000 Act or subsequently had attained adulthood would not matter – If accused was juvenile, court would, even when maintaining conviction, send the case to Board to issue direction and order in accordance with provisions of 2000 Act. (Para 11)
(C) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302/34 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Sections 7-A, 20 and 64 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 25 – Murder – Common intention – Life sentence – Plea of juvenility by accused – Provisions of 2000 Act are to apply as if juvenile had been ordered by Board to be sent to special home or institution and ordered to be kept under protective care – Statute overrules and modifies sentence awarded, even in decided cases – This court at this stage can decide and determine question of juvenility of appellant, notwithstanding fact that appellant was not entitled to benefit of being a juvenile on date of offence, under 1986 Act and had turned an adult when 2000 Act was enforced – As appellant was less than 18 years of age on date of commission of offence on 11.12.1981, he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per 2000 Act – Conviction of appellant upheld but sentence of life imprisonment set aside – Matter remitted to jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions under Section 15 of the 2000 Act including question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and compensation to be awarded to family of deceased. (Paras 12 and 17)
Facts of the case:
By the order dated 17.08.2018, the Special Leave Petition, challenging the judgment dated 20.4.2018 of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, filed by Keshav Ram and Ram Kuber was dismissed, albeit in the case of co-accused Satya Deo@ Bhoorey notice was issued on the plea of juvenility. The impugned judgment had confirmed the conviction of Keshav Ram, Ram Kuber and Satya Deo by the trial court in FIR No. 156/1981 dated 11.12.1981 Police Station Gilaula, Distt. Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) and the order of sentence directing them to undergo imprisonment for life.
Findings of Court:
While we uphold the conviction of Satya Deo, we would set aside the sentence of life imprisonment. We would remit the matter to the jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions under Section 15 of the 2000 Act including the question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and the compensation to be awarded to the family of the deceased. We make no affirmative or negative comments either way on the order/direction under Section 15 of the 2000 Act.
Result : Appeal Partly allowed.
JUDGMENT :
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. By the order dated 17.08.2018, the Special Leave Petition, challenging the judgment dated 20.4.2018 of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, filed by Keshav Ram and Ram Kuber was dismissed, albeit in the case of co-accused Satya Deo@ Bhoorey notice was issued on the plea of juvenility. The impugned judgment had confirmed the conviction of Keshav Ram, Ram Kuber and Satya Deo by the trial court in FIR No. 156/1981 dated 11.12.1981 Police Station Gilaula, Distt. Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh for the offence under Section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) and the order of sentence directing them to undergo imprisonment for life.
2. By order dated 02.05.2019 leave was granted in the case of Satya Deo.
3. By order dated 22.11.2019 the trial court was directed to conduct an inquiry to ascertain if Satya Deo was a juvenile on the date of occurrence i.e. 11.12.1981, on the basis of material which would be placed on record.
4. Pursuant to the directions, the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh has conducted an inquiry and submitted the report dated 06.03.2020. As per the report, the date of birth of Satya Deo is 15.4.1965. Accordingly, he was 16 years 7 months and 26 days of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. 11.12.1981. The report relies on the Transfer Certificate (in original) issued by Ram Narayan Singh Inter College, Ramnagar Khajuri, Bahraich, and the Admission Register of Primary School, Pairi, which documents were proved by Sh. Krishn Deo, Clerk at Ram Narayan Singh Inter College, Ramnagar Khajuri, Bahraich, and Smt. Anupam Singh, in-charge head-mistress of Primary School, Pairi, respectively. Further, Satya Deo had appeared in class-10 examination vide Roll. No. 9020777, and his date of birth as recorded in the gazette relating to this examination is 15.04.1965.
5. The report states that the complainant had died and consequently notice was served on the heirs of the complainant, who did not appear before the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahraich. The prosecution had not led any evidence.
6. The date of birth of Satya Deo is undisputed and not challenged before us.
7. Notwithstanding this finding, the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bahraich has observed that Satya Deo was not a juvenile as per the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (1986 Act) as he was more than 16 year of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. 11.12.1981.
8. The conundrum is in light of the definition of ‘juvenile’ under the 1986 Act, which was below sixteen years in case of a boy and below eighteen years in case of a girl on the date the boy or girl is brought for first appearance before the court or the competent authority, whereas the 2000 Act, as noticed below, does not distinguish between a boy or girl and a person under the age of eighteen years is a juvenile. Further, under the 2000 Act, the age on the date of commission of the offence is the determining factor.
8. In light of the conflicting views expressed by this Court on application of the 2000 Act to the pending proceedings, vide decisions in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 and Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982) 2 SCC 202, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench and decided in the case reported as Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2005) 3 SCC 551. The Constitution Bench formulated two points for decision, namely:
“(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining the age of the alleged offender as juvenile offender or the date when he is produced in the court/competent authority.
(b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding is initiated under the 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 1-4-2001.”
9. On the second question, the Constitution Bench held that the 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding instituted
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