UDAY UMESH LALIT, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA
Kamatchi – Appellant
Versus
Lakshmi Narayanan – Respondent
The legal document discusses the principles related to the limitation period for initiating cognizance of offences, particularly under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the relevant Act. The key points are as follows:
The period within which cognizance must be taken is generally prescribed to ensure timely proceedings, but it should not prejudice the complainant or prosecuting agency if delays occur due to reasons beyond their control (!) (!) .
The initiation of proceedings or filing of a complaint within the prescribed limitation period is crucial. If these actions are timely, the court can take cognizance even after the limitation period has expired, provided the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the control of the complainant or prosecution (!) (!) .
The starting point for the limitation period, especially under the relevant Act, is the date of the commission of the offence, not the date when an application under the Act is filed or when the breach of an order occurs (!) (!) .
The interpretation of "cognizance" is significant; it is primarily the act of the court applying its mind to the case, which may be different from the act of filing a complaint or initiating proceedings. The limitation period is linked more closely to the date of filing or institution rather than the date of cognizance (!) (!) .
In cases where proceedings are initiated within the limitation period but cognizance is taken after the period, the court may still proceed if the complaint or proceedings were filed timely, emphasizing the importance of the filing date over the date of cognizance (!) (!) .
The procedural provisions under the Act, especially regarding applications under Section 12, are distinct from the procedures under the Criminal Procedure Code. An application under Section 12 is not equivalent to lodging a complaint, and the limitation rules applicable to complaints do not directly apply to such applications (!) (!) .
The concept of continuing offence is relevant in some contexts, where offences or acts of violence or breach are ongoing, and the limitation period may be extended accordingly. However, the specific circumstances and the nature of the offence determine whether the limitation period applies or is extended (!) (!) .
The court emphasizes that procedural laws, including limitation statutes, should be interpreted in a manner that promotes justice and fairness, avoiding undue prejudice to diligent complainants or prosecutors due to delays beyond their control (!) .
In summary, the key takeaway is that the limitation period for initiating criminal proceedings is anchored to the date of the complaint or institution of prosecution, not solely the date of cognizance. Exceptions exist where delays are caused by circumstances beyond the control of the complainant or prosecution, allowing proceedings to be initiated beyond the limitation period. Additionally, procedural distinctions under the relevant Act influence how limitation principles are applied.
JUDGMENT :
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 16.03.2020 passed by the High Court1 [High Court of Judicature at Madras] in Crl. O.P. No. 28924 of 2018.
3. The present proceedings arise out of an application preferred by the appellant under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) which was numbered as D.V.C. No. 21 of 2018 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur, Chennai. The application was filed seeking appropriate protection in terms of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act and was preferred against the respondent-husband as well as the father-in-law and sister-in-law of the appellant. The Protection Officer vide his Domestic Inspection Report dated 21.08.2018 tabulated the incidents of domestic violence as under:
| S. No. | Date, Place and Time of violence | Persons who caused domestic violence | Types of violence | Remarks |
| Physical violence | ||||
| 1. | 25.08.2007 Husband’s Home | Father-in-law Mother-in-l | ||
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya vs. State of Maharashtra
U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra
Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases
Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases etc. and Others
Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt & Anr.
Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada
Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh
A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr.
Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal
Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases
Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Anr.
Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhary
Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (supra) and NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. vs. NOIDA
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla vs. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd.
State of Kerala vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth
Meghmala vs. G. Narasimha Reddy
Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and Another
Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (D) by LRs. and Others vs. Pramod Gupta (D) by LRs. and Others
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.