SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. Abdul Nazeer, J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.
Yogesh Jain – Appellant
Versus
Sumesh Chadha – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1760-1761 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl) No(s). 1805-1806 of 2020)
Decided On : 10-10-2022
Negotiable Instruments Act - Summoning of Accused - Section 138 of the N.I. Act - 1881 - Summary
Fact of the Case:
The appeals were filed by the original complainant against the orders passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which quashed the summoning of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court quashed the proceedings on the premise that the legally enforceable debt was time-barred, and there was no acknowledgment of the debt by the accused within the limitation period.
Issues: The issues revolved around the acknowledgment of the debt, the limitation period for recovering the debt, and the lack of opportunity for the complainant to be heard.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found that the limitation period for the debt should start from the expiry of the period agreed upon for repayment, and the issue of whether the cheque was issued for a time-barred debt was a matter of evidence that could not be adjudicated in the application filed by the accused under Section 482 of the CrPC.
Final Decision: The impugned orders passed by the High Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration and an opportunity for all parties to be heard.
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are at the instance of the original complainant of a complaint lodged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short 'the N.I. Act') and are directed against the orders passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 15.01.2020 in the CRM-M No. 27736 of 2019 by which the High Court quashed the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ludhiana summoning the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and the order passed by the High Court dated 29.01.2020 in the CRM No. 3389 of 2020 (recall application) in CRM-M No. 27736 of 2019 by which the High Court rejected the application for recalling of the above order dated 15.01.2020 passed in the CRM-M No. 27736 of 2019.
3. The respondent (original accused) although served with the notice issued by this Court yet has chosen not to remain present before this Court either in person or through an advocate and oppose these appeals.
4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and having gone through the materials on record, more particularly the impugned order, we find that the High Court thought fit to quash the proceedings on the premise that on the date of summoning the accused the legally enforceable debt was time barred.
5. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the footing that there is no averment in the entire complaint as regards any kind of acknowledgment of the said debt by the accused within the period of three years i.e. within the limitation period of recovering the debt.
6. It appears prima facie from the materials on record that the loan was advanced sometime in the year 2011. The cheque in question duly issued by the accused for the discharge of the debt is dated 01.11.2018 and complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was lodged on 14.01.2019. It appears that the High Court has gone by the date of the loan transaction to be precise the year of the loan transaction. If a cheque is issued on 01.11.2018 for the discharge of the debt incurred in the year 2011 then prima facie it could be said to be an acknowledgement of the debt. This aspect needs to be re-considered by the High Court in its true perspective. The High Court in its impugned order has observed as under:-
'There is no averment in the entire complaint as regards any kind of acknowledgement of the said debt by the petitioner within the period of three years i.e. the limitation period to recover the debt. Thus, there being no acknowledgement by or on behalf of the accused, it cannot be said that the complaint filed in respect of the said debt was maintainable.'
7. Thus, what is sought to be conveyed by the High Court is that the acknowledgement of the debt at the instance of the accused should have been within three years from the date of transaction and there is no averment in the complaint in this regard. We fail to understand such a line of reasoning by the High Court. We say so because the loan which was advanced of Rs. Five Lakh by the complainant to the accused was for a period of seven years. Prima facie, it appears that the liability towards repayment of the loan was to be discharged within a period of seven years. If that be so, then on what basis the initial first three years have been taken into consideration by the High Court for the purpose of counting the limitation. Perhaps what is in the mind of the High Court is that by the time, the cheque in question was issued the debt had become barred by limitation because no acknowledgement was obtained before the expiry of three years from the date of loan. However, as noted above, the understanding was to discharge the liability within a period of seven years. Prima facie, we are of the view that the period of limitation would start reckoning from the expiry of the period of seven years.
8. Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a statutory notice is issued, it is for the accused to dislodge th
The limitation period for a debt should start from the expiry of the period agreed upon for repayment, and the issue of whether a cheque was issued for a time-barred debt is a matter of evidence.
Dishonour of cheque – Question regarding time barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be dec....
The legal point established is that the existence of a time-barred debt should be determined based on evidence during the trial, and the burden of proof lies with the accused to establish the non-exi....
The nature of the debt must be proven during trial, and there is a presumption in favor of the holder of the cheque.
The issue of whether a cheque was issued for a time-barred debt is a matter for evidence and cannot be adjudicated before the court.
Point of Law : Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, Section 139 of N.I. Act, includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability, which is a rebuttal one.
Dishonour of cheque – Cheque itself is a promise to pay even if debt is barred by time.
A debtor's issuance of a cheque acknowledges a debt; questions of enforceability or time-bar must be determined through evidence, not prior to trial.
A cheque issued for a time-barred debt does not constitute a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, leading to no offence being committed.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.