Judicial criticism is protected under free speech, but distortion or scandalous remarks undermining the judiciary's authority may invoke contempt, which is exercised at the court's discretion.

ORDER

This petition under Article 32 read with Article 129 of the Constitution of India seeks initiation of suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against respondent No. 4, Nishikant Dubey, for having made deliberate and scandalizing remarks against the Supreme Court of India and the Chief Justice of India; for a direction to the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, to lodge a First Information Report under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and for a direction to the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, to issue an advisory to all Chief Secretaries to curb hate and provocative speeches by political parties and their leaders relating to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, and its hearing before this Court.

2. Normally, this Bench would not have heard this matter but as we are not inclined to issue notice and the Waqf matter [W.P. (C) Nos. 276/2025, 314/2025, 284/2025, 331/2025 & 269/2025.] was heard y the two of us, we would dispose of the writ petition with some observations and, accordingly, we have proceeded to consider the issue.

3. Judicial pronouncements result in an order or a decision which may aggrieve a party or sometimes a section of the public. Critical analysis and objective criticism of an order’s reasoning or even its outcome is protected under the fundamental right to free speech and expression under clause (a) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. The power of criminal contempt, however, is exercised by courts when publication by words, spoken or written, by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise, in terms of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, [For short, “the Act”.] is with the intent to scandalize or lower the authority of the courts; or tends to scandalize or lower such authority; prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings; or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner. Exercise of the power of contempt, nevertheless, is discretionary.

4. We have examined the contents of the assertions made by respondent no. 4, which no doubt tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, if not interfere or tend to interfere with the judicial proceedings pending before this Court, and have the tendency to interfere and obstruct the administration of justice. The statements made reflect the clear intent to impute motives to the Bench itself by naming the Chief Justice of India as “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible”. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act carve out exceptions which, prima facie, are not attracted. There is no ‘civil war’ in India.

5. In our opinion, the comments were highly irresponsible and reflect a penchant to attract attention by casting aspersions on the Supreme Court of India and the Judges of the Supreme Court. This apart, the statements show ignorance about the role of the constitutional courts and the duties and obligations bestowed on them under the Constitution. At the same time, we are of the firm opinion that courts are not as fragile as flowers to wither and wilt under such ludicrous statements. We do not believe that the confidence in and credibility of the courts in the eyes of the public can be shaken by such absurd statements, though it can be said without the shadow of doubt that there is a desire and deliberate attempt to do so.

6. We, therefore, refrain from taking any action. This Court in, In Re S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339 observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism, but when criticism is an obvious distortion or a gross misstatement, which is made in a manner designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence, it should not be ignored. However, the power to initiate contempt is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise. Every commiss