JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is directed against an order of dismissal of an application for execution of a decree. The decree was made on the 5th November 1906. The first application for execution was made on the 12th October 1909. Notice under Or. 21, r. 22 was directed to issue, as more than a year had elapsed from the date of the decree. There is an entry, in the order-sheet of return of service, which states that notice was served duly. But, on the 15th December 1909, the application was dismissed for default, as neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor was present. The second application for execution was made on the 15th July 1911. Notice was directed to issue on the judgment-debtors under Or. 21, r. 22. The entry in the order-sheet made on the 7th August 1911 recites that the notice had been duly served. On the 21st August 1911, the Court directed a writ of attachment to issue in respect of the immoveable properties of the judgment-debtors. There is an entry in the order-sheet that the writ had been served in due course. This was followed by an order for proclamation of sale. But the proclamation was not published and the case was again dismissed for default on the 16th January 1912. The present application for execution was made on the 24th January 1913. The judgment-debtors entered appearance and contended that the application was barred by limitation. The Courts below have given effect to this objection and have dismissed the application. They have found that the application for execution made on the 12th October 1909 was defective in substance, that time was accordingly given to the decree-holder to amend and re-file the application within five days, that the application was not re-filed within the time allowed, and, that, even when re-filed on the 20th November 1909, without leave obtained for extension of time, it was defective in material particulars. On these grounds, the Courts have held that the application of the 12th October 1909 was not in accordance with law to the proper Court to take a step in aid of execution, that the subsequent application for execution made on the 10th July 1911 was consequently of no avail to the decree-holder, and that the present application was thus clearly barred by limitation. Neither of the Courts below, however, has examined in detail the proceedings on the basis of the second application for execution, and, this omission has, in our opinion, led to an error of law which vitiates their concurrent decision. An examination of the order-sheet in the proceedings on the basis of the second application discloses that on the 21st August 1911, the Court directed a writ of attachment to issue. This was in substance a determination that the decree was on that date alive and capable of execution. So long as that determination stands, it is impossible for the judgment-debtors to contend that the present application is barred by limitation. [Mangal Prosad Dichit v. Girija K. Lahiri (I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51 (1881))]. The order for attachment was, if the entries in the order-sheet are reliable, made after service of notice on the judgment-debtors under r. 22 of Or. 21 of the Code, and was followed by service of the writ of attachment. Consequently, to entitle the judgment-debtors to escape from the operation of the order of the 21st August 1911, they must establish that the order was made without notice to them. The principle applicable to cases of this character as deducible from a long line of cases [Maazzam Hossein v. Sarat Kumari Debi (11 C.L.J. 357 (1909)), Mon Mohon v. Dwarka Nath (12 C.L.J. 312, (1910)) and Mochai Mandal v. Meseruddin Mollah (18 C.L.J. 26 (1910))] is that an order made at one stage of execution proceedings cannot be questioned at a later stage, unless the parties sought to be bound by such order had no notice of the proceedings. Cases are by no means rare where orders have been obtained in execution proceedings without service of notice on the judgment-debtor, who has s