An acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, does not require an unconditional admission of the liability. It is sufficient if the acknowledgment admits the subsistence of a jural relationship and shows an intention to admit a subsisting liability on the date of the acknowledgment.

( 1 ) THIS regular first appeal has been filed against the judgement and decree of Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi, dated December 27, 1963 in favour of the respondent for a sum of Rs. 12,865. 69 with proportionate costs.

( 2 ) THE respondent carried on business of supplying tents on hire. He hired out tents from time to time to different Government schools run by Delhi Administration as per details in the statement marked a annexed to the plaint. The respondent claimed that a sum of Rs. 24,553/12/3 became due to him on account of hire charges of the tents and that because the tents, when returned were found to be damaged and some of the items were also not returned and were found missing, he was further entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,826/4. 00 by way of damages for these damaged and lost items. Out of the total amount so becoming due, he stated that a sum of Rs. 22,514/0/3 had been paid to him by the Administration, leaving a balance of Rs. 12,866. 00 which was not paid in spite of demands and notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code Hence the suit. The claim, it was pleaded, was within time because of the part payments made by the Administration through its duly authorised agents and also because the Administration acknowledged their liability for the claims in suit from time to time. Besides Union of India, Director of Education, Delhi, was impleaded as defendant No. 2 to the suit.

"the suit was contested by both the defendants. In the written statement, it was denied that the hire charges claimed were due or that any damage was caused to the tents or that any item hired was not returned and found to be lost. It was maintained that no valid contract came into existence between the parties as envisaged in Article 299 of the Constitution and no claim on the basis of a contract could, therefore, be laid. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by time. At the time of issues, learned counsel for the respondent made a statement that no hiring contract as envisaged in Article 299, came into existence between the parties in the correspondence that was being relied upon by the respondent in support of the claims in suit. The trial court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether defendant No. 2 hired tents as per details given in the statement marked a annexed to the plaint ? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants a sum of Rs. 2039/12. 00 on account of the balance hire charges for the aforesaid tents ? (3) Whether any damage or loss was caused to the properties belonging to the plaintiff as detailed in the statement marked a ? If so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages for the said loss and damage from the defendant ? If so, to what amount ? (4) Whether the suit is within limitation? (5) Whether defendant No. 1 is liable to pay the amount in suit or any part thereof to the plaintiff notwithstanding the admitted fact that the hire contracts did not comply with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India ? (6) Relief ?

( 3 ) ISSUES 1, 2 and 3 were found in favour of the respondent. Under issue No. 4, the court held that the suit was within time as it had been filed within three years of the dates when the claims of the respondent for the balance of the hire charges and damages were sanctioned vide the intimation of the sanction Exhibit P. 127 and the letters that followed it. Under issue No. 5, the finding was that the appellants were liable to pay the amount sued for, by way of compensation under section 70 of the Contract Act.

( 4 ) SHRI B. N. Kirpal, appearing for the appellant, has not challenged the finding of the trial court under issue No. 5. The only points canvassed by him in support of the appeal are: firstly, that the suit should have been held to be barred by time because the intimation of sanction Exhibit P. 127 and the letters that followed were not acknowledgements within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and, s